

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

3L
53
28

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

by

GEORGE BARTON CUTTEN

President of Colgate University



Harper & Brothers Publishers

New York and London

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Copyright, 1940, by Harper & Brothers
Printed in the United States of America

FIRST EDITION

B-P

All rights in this book are reserved.
No part of the book may be reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission.

For information address
Harper & Brothers

Theology Library
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
AT CLAREMONT
California

*This book is dedicated to the memory of
our daughter*

MARGARITA JOY CUTTEN

New Haven, Conn., February 11, 1902

St. Paul, Minn., September 1, 1926

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Introduction | 1 |
| I. Instincts | 7 |
| II. Intelligence | 27 |
| III. Morals | 40 |
| IV. Religion | 52 |
| V. Sin | 71 |
| VI. Modern Theology | 87 |
| VII. Hymnology | 116 |
| VIII. The Appeal of the Instinct in This Twentieth Century | 137 |
| Index | 153 |

PREFACE

THE last paragraph of the preface to my book *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, published in 1908, consists of these words: "It is my hope to make this the basis of another study in which the theory shall have the more prominent part." I have published several books since then, but none of these was concerned with religious theory. I trust that this present volume may be considered a partial fulfillment of this hope, long deferred.

GEORGE BARTON CUTTEN

Colgate University
January 1, 1940

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

Does an introduction really introduce? Should there not be an introduction to an introduction, and so on *ad infinitum*? Sometimes, when the introduction is the part of the book most difficult to understand, this seems to be indicated. One of the most effective bits of introduction was given by the mayor of a western town when introducing a famous orator. He said, "I have been asked to introduce Dr. So-and-so, who is to speak to you; I have now done it, he will now do it."

However, some form of introduction seems required by this study since the psychological approach to religion through the instincts is not only a novel one, but, I fear, an unpopular one, both from the standpoint of psychology and of religion. For the past while, the psychologists have been trying to annihilate the instincts by ignoring them, and those interested in religion have usually considered them their deadly enemies. However, the instincts object to being ignored, and absolutely refuse to be annihilated, so, if religion deals with the whole man, it must take account of them; finding them friendly instead of belligerent may, I hope, be welcome news. It has long been recognized that, in some way, religion meets deep and persistent needs in human

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

nature; the deepest and most persistent needs which man finds are instinctive.

I know that the very mention of the word "instinctive" stirs up antagonistic feelings in some persons, but calling it by some other name does not help; you know, a red trillium by any other name would smell as vile. The word does stand for a biological factor in human life—and an important one, without doubt. It is true that our advancement in knowledge during the past century has given us a different content to the term, but it has not eliminated the fact. Perhaps I might anticipate sufficiently to quote my definition of instinct which is used as a conclusion to the discussion in the first chapter. This will be found quite different from the early definitions, and, I trust, remove some of the objections which have clustered around them. It is this: "An instinct is an insistent but unlearned activity toward originally unrecognized ends, which is common to the species, and the consummation of which may be modified by experience."

It is probable that there are no psychological factors which call forth so little agreement and so many individual interpretations as do the instincts. Everyone seems to have his own private scheme, and admits that it is the best. On this account it is difficult to decide upon which scheme to use for illustrative purposes. If I use that of some psychoanalysts, I find too few instincts and those erroneously comprehensive. If I use

INTRODUCTION

James', then I have too many. Largely on account of the conservative number, the more definite boundaries, and the scholarly study devoted to them, I shall make more frequent use of McDougall's scheme, even if a critical analysis would force me to disagree with him somewhat.

The charge is sometimes made that instead of explaining instinct we use it to explain other things. Well? Is that a new procedure in science? Before we had any idea of what electricity was, we used it to explain lightning and galvanic cells and silver plating and doorbells, and even now we do not know too much about it, but we are using it to explain almost the entire universe. Science would stop with all brakes set if we waited to know all about any subject before we use it to explain something else. Sometimes the use of a subject for explanatory purposes enables us to know more about the subject itself. I make no apology for this procedure; I glory in my shame.

Our forefathers resented our connecting religion in any way with bodily forces or lower mental elements. To them, it was a spiritual affair which related it definitely with God, but its connection with man was tenuous and somewhat experimental. But man is body as well as mind, and if religion is to minister to him it must take account of both factors. At any rate, man is what he is, and if he is to be religious he must be

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

so as the real man that we find him and not as some creation of the imagination.

We have discovered that the highest accomplishments of man are built out of crude elements, and animal influences are not wanting. After all, it is not what the elements are, but what use we make of them, which is important. We have learned that a study of origins may be valuable in furnishing explanations but not in determining ultimate values. "Not by their roots, but by their fruits ye shall know them."

The instincts have had few friends among their psychological teammates. Other mental elements seemed to find some reason for being in opposition to them. In this study, we have not found this to be the condition: the intellect, for example, is seen to be supplementary to instinctive action, and working continuously in harmony with it; they are as cooperative as true yoke-fellows. Morals, which were usually directly opposed to instincts in the minds of most people, are found to be dependent upon them, both directly and indirectly; and even religion, often conceived as exalted far above the level of instinctive actions, is discovered to be impossible without the instinctive drives.

The uses of the instincts in human personality, as presented here, show, above other things, a unity and harmony which would be impossible if instincts were either ignored, or set over in a special compartment by themselves. I presume we have not explored the sub-

INTRODUCTION

terranean caverns of psychoanalysis as much as some persons would desire, for in this case it has not been so necessary; but, as I pointed out many years ago, the subconscious elements are duly recognized as necessary in the full explanation of many religious experiences.

The instability of religion would lead us to judge that it is the latest stage of evolution and in its early development. Compared with the physical nature, man morally and religiously is but a babe in arms. He will come to maturity in these particulars slowly, but none the less surely; we have no reason to think, however, that these sides of his nature will ever be complete, any more than his physical life will be. Change will always be the order.

As we trace the role of the instincts through the following pages, we shall see, I hope, how fundamental they are, and recognize them as necessary to the religious life of man as they are to his physical existence. It is this basis in the instincts which connects the religion of primitive man to that of the twentieth century. It is the same basis which provides a solidarity to each form of religion, and it is only the individual reaction which gives the wide variety of expression to the same religious cult.

I shall endeavor to trace the development of man from the instincts through intelligence, morals, and religion, showing the connection of each to the others. Modern developments in religion are noted to show

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

the trend; the failure of certain modern movements, due largely to following the lead of psychology in ignoring the instincts, is also noted. Our illustrative material is taken from our own local conditions and from Christianity, but other countries and other religions would furnish equally pertinent illustration.

In trying to reconcile religious experience with the theory of evolution as well as with many other modern scientific theories, I have followed the lead of modern theology. At the same time I have criticized modern methods of presentation and practice, which, in trying to escape from a crass emotionalism, deal so largely in appeals to the intellect and ignore the appeals to the instincts. Reaction rarely stops on dead center, and this one certainly did not, but swung over to a somewhat stilted form and practice of rationalism. I try to show, especially by many illustrations and examples, how to reconcile rationalistic theory with appeals to the instincts. Appeals to the instincts are the only ones which have any motive power, and if religion is to move men, these appeals must be used and used freely.

There has been no attempt to make this study exhaustive; the most ambitious hope was and is that it might be suggestive, and that preachers and workers in religious fields might be directed to a method that would be more effective than the appeal to the intellect which has already proved its sterility.

Chapter I

INSTINCTS

"INSTINCT" is hardly a chapter heading in human psychology today! Strange, isn't it? This reaction has come about during the last quarter of a century, and perhaps the reasons for this are not difficult to determine. In the endeavor to make psychology a true science, exact measurements are demanded and exact differentiations are required. This is not so easy when we come to deal with human instincts. We have been much interested in the process of learning and in trying to measure that, and not so much interested in actions which did not have to be learned.

Reckoning how long it takes a rat to learn a maze is much simpler than separating native from acquired traits, and experiments on animals, so popular today, have not followed along the line of instincts. There is, however, a somewhat odd inconsistency in comparative psychology: after experimenting with rats in the matter of learning, it does not seem to be irregular to predicate of human beings traits which these experiments show to be common to rats. Might it not be that a transference regarding instinctive tendencies would be equally legitimate and just as valuable?

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Attempts to measure human instincts have been too analytical to give exact results—or not sufficiently analytical to give satisfactory results. We want either millimeters or nothing. We have been getting the latter and seem content. Different from many human experiences, each instinct uses the whole organism for its expression; to subdivide the experience into too fine particles is to lose its import; like Yankee Doodle we are unable to see the town, there are so many houses. Each instinct, however, does admit of some analysis.

It has been easier to credit everything to the intellect and to try to measure intellectual factors than it has been to differentiate between instinctive and intellectual factors, and to measure both. For a while we tried to force instincts into the chain-reflex pattern, and when they refused to be so constricted we abandoned them as incorrigible and inexplicable. It has been most interesting, however, to see them thrown out the front door with a great deal of noise and publicity, and then later stealthily drawn in the back door disguised and renamed. As much as some wanted to get rid of them they were forced to use them to explain human phenomena. Thus we may account for the origin of "drive," "urge," "need," "desire," "aversion," "libido," and similar terms in modern psychological literature.

There are, however, distinct evidences that instincts

INSTINCTS

are being restored to their former place, except that now less emphasis is being placed on the mysterious and magical qualities. Recognizing that they do not take the place of learning and habit, but provide the initial stimulus for both, we are seeing a less antagonistic and a more scientific attention on the part of those whose work it is to deal with such subjects. The attempt to banish them from human psychology was doomed to be a failure, and that is being recognized more clearly today.

The aim, here, is not to try to force upon anyone something which has been discarded as untenable, but to endeavor to realize that certain conceptions, which have been laid aside for the moment, on account of their apparent inconsistencies with matters of greater interest, are really so important and insistent that they must be taken into account. The fact that we have assigned them to the urge or libido pigeonhole for future reference and study may be all right, but it seems now an opportune time to re-examine them.

Undoubtedly, the early conception of instinct was too comprehensive and occult. It seemed, as some persons portrayed it, more like black magic than a part of the scientific study of psychology. When we discovered that some of the elements included were not native, or, at least, not universal, but depended upon the particular culture of the people which we were

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

studying, we were tempted to discard the whole conception and to try to trace all the elements to learning, and to credit to a cultural basis more than the facts justified.

Much of the use made, in this study, of the conception of instincts may be found in some form in the holdings of some psychologists, if we are careful to translate the terms; but it requires considerable digging in many cases, and a good deal of patching. However that may be, there seems to be little to which the modern psychologist can object in the attitude here assumed, provided we can agree upon the definition of terms.

There has undoubtedly been a reaction to certain uses of the concept of instinct prevalent during the early part of this century, of which two have been outstanding. The psychoanalysts have laid emphasis on one instinct only, such as Freud did originally with the sex instinct, and so broadened and warped the commonly accepted definition of that instinct as to prostitute the use of language as we understand it and lead to unfortunate confusion and misunderstanding. No one instinct is sufficient to explain either animal or human nature, and to try to force it to do so is to bring the whole subject into disrepute. In fact, instincts may be more or less antagonistic, and help to balance human nature. The psychoanalysts have done one good

INSTINCTS

service for us, however: they have insisted on the power and drive of instincts in the human personality, even if they have not agreed upon the particular ones which should be recognized.

The other reaction, while very different, is as easily understood. Instead of trying to include all instinctive action under the head of one instinct, some people found an easy explanation for all action by positing a new and different instinct for every human trait. There was an instinct of work and an instinct of play, a moral instinct and a criminal instinct, a musical instinct and a building instinct, a wandering instinct and a homing instinct, a commercial instinct and a spiritual instinct—a special instinct to fit every individual case and to explain every act. Some who have taken the trouble to note and to classify references have found allusions to hundreds of different instincts. Uncritical writers of fiction have felt at liberty to assign to instinctive stimulus any action not the result of prolonged and deliberate study and reflection. A sudden and unpremeditated act, which could be assigned to instinct, gave a dramatic touch and furnished a solution to a difficult problem which a hero was facing. Trying to explain so much in this way resulted in not being permitted to explain anything. Unreasonable, to be sure, but very natural!

The sociologists have made the most insistent de-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

mand for instincts in recent years, but even they are weakening somewhat. Dealing as they do with men in large groups, the instinctive urges are absolutely necessary to explain many of their phenomena. Social actions, based principally on the instinct of gregariousness, demand for their explanation many other instincts of a supplementary nature, and nothing but instinctive urges is competent to explain them. A social psychology which eliminates instinct is impotent and unreliable, in fact, it is committing suicide.

If it is true that sociologists require instincts, it is equally true that they demand environmental influences. Without the latter, all social science is bereft of factors which could bring about change. If instincts comprehend the total experience from the initial drive to the last effect, the social sciences must be wholly descriptive. With the addition of learning, habits, and other experiences which supplement the instincts in human beings, opportunity is given for a science which may be experimental and creative. The attempt on the part of some enthusiasts to belittle instincts in order to exalt environmental factors and thus emphasize the importance of the social sciences has reacted unfavorably. It simply showed that the so-called social sciences had not grasped the scientific method.

Probably the most potent reason for discounting instincts was, and is, the natural tendency to flatter our-

INSTINCTS

selves. Thinking of intellect as a superior mental quality, we have made the claim that we are motivated by intelligence rather than by instinct. We have thus endeavored to establish our superiority over the animals. Well, there seems to be little doubt but that we have more intelligence than the animals, and as little doubt that we have more instincts; so where does that put us? We are different from the animals, not that we have eliminated much of their nature, but that we have added to it.

If we take the position that man is now motivated by intelligence, we must admit that in the dim and distant past, when his relation to the other animals was much easier to recognize, he must have relied more definitely upon instincts. That, however, is history, not present reality. Any attempt to trace an instinctive residuum to modern man, we are told, shows a gross materialism and a total incapacity to recognize the intellectual achievements of the present day. Perhaps so! Man does have an increased capacity for rational consideration, and in instinctive matters his intelligence modifies the appearance of instinct by furnishing an increasing number of modes of reaction, but we should not allow these facts to delude us into thinking that the instinctive impulse is thoroughly enfeebled, simply because man's conduct no longer has the appearance of a narrow concentration on its instinctive

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

object. There is little doubt, however, that the modifications, which intelligence has made, have tended to obscure the original instinctive impulse, and will probably do so more and more as these modifications increase.

Beside that of being willing to flatter ourselves, there are several reasons why we have been misled into thinking that man is no longer motivated by instincts, and that now intelligence has taken the primary role. The human infant is very young and most immature when he is born. Compared with insects which display all their instincts at birth or incubation, or even the domestic animals which display many, the baby is almost devoid of them. He cannot walk, he does not know his mother from anyone else, he does not even know where to look for his breakfast; a few physiological reactions are his stock in trade. He knows enough to suckle and to grasp, but what else? His instincts develop gradually and irregularly; it takes him fifteen to twenty years to develop all of them. Distribute the unfolding of the instincts of the insect or bird over twenty years and there would be surprisingly little appearing at any one time to astonish us.

We further recognize that our instincts are developing during the time which in our social system is devoted to education, and it is well that this is so, for it enables us to modify them in a way which we think will be beneficial. It is to be feared, however, that not

INSTINCTS

a little of the credit which we assign to education is the result of developing instincts. You hear young parents speak of teaching a baby to creep or to walk; you can teach a baby to walk about as much as you can teach a hen to sit or a bird to fly. Did you ever try to teach a hen to sit? After all your strenuous but unsuccessful effort at peripatetic instruction, when you are thinking about something else, the baby starts to walk. You cannot teach him, and you cannot stop him. Naturally his walking improves greatly through practice, and becomes fixed through habit. I am the last person to decry education, but let us give it its proper place as a modifier of instinct—not as a substitute for it.

Yes, instincts may be modified; they are not nearly so rigid as many people suppose. Even in insects and birds where the patterns seem to be definite, changed conditions modify the methods and sequences so as to make a noticeable difference. Solitary wasps have had considerable study and their instincts fill us with astonishment and wonder, yet a study of them shows many individual modifications. Some wasps now use the inside of human dwellings for nesting where formerly they used hollow trees. A similar modification and adaptation would be true of the chimney swallow. Mason wasps, as a rule, deposit one egg in a cell, but occasionally one will close up a cell without depositing any egg, and at other times two or three eggs may be

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

deposited in a single cell. Each species of wasp attacks one species of prey, yet one of a species which usually only hunts the grasshopper was noticed with a cricket. Some wasps before paralyzing their prey normally give preliminary stings. These may vary from one to five or be omitted altogether. Some cut off the legs of spiders before depositing them in their nest, but this act varies considerably—all legs may be cut off, any number may be removed, or this mutilation omitted entirely. Each species has a specific spot on the prey for depositing the egg, evidently in order that the egg may be protected, but an individual may place an egg outside the accustomed place. These are but fugitive examples of modification and variation which could be multiplied indefinitely. It is true that modification may be only slight, but in certain cases it may be sufficiently great to provide survival.

It was these modifications which caused psychologists to abandon the chain-reflex theory of instincts. It was these modifications which made natural selection a possibility, the most advantageous modification becoming the surviving pattern. Now, in human instincts, where modifications are made through intelligence, the intelligence receives the credit for the whole process as education in other circumstances does. This matter of modification through intelligence is most important

INSTINCTS

in our understanding of human instincts, and will be taken up more fully later.

There is still another reason why the power of instincts in human life is not more clearly recognized and that is the transitory character of most instincts. They arise, last for varying lengths of time, depending upon the particular instinct, then weaken and disappear unless during the period of their strength they become changed into habits, or unless a regression causes a reindulgence in the activity some time after the natural period has elapsed. One great trouble with the study of human instincts is that we can rarely if ever discover them twenty-four karats fine. Probably in human life, except in earliest infancy, a purely instinctive act is impossible after the first appearance, for intellectual elements are introduced, and habit may take over the function. If, by chance, an instinctive activity is performed in a certain (perhaps unusual) way the first time, it may habitually be performed in that way in all subsequent experience, or it may be modified by intelligence.

Regressions are not so common, and they are not always easily recognized as such. One of the best examples we have is of the sucking instinct which normally disappears at the end of the first year of life when the development of the body and the cutting of teeth permit of the intake of food by chewing. It

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

reappears in adult life, and is quickly reinforced by habit, in tobacco and other forms of smoking. The fact, however, that instincts last only a limited length of time and then disappear leads us to think of them less as instincts, if we do not forget them entirely.

Hiding behind modern social conditions, being overshadowed by more showy mental factors, we can hardly doubt that instincts, which are absolutely indispensable and most important elements in the preservation of both the individual and species in the animal world, continue to be the chief motive power in human life. In fact, it is the motive power which is the vital element in instincts. It consists of two parts: there is first the initial impulse, usually unknown until it starts to function, and then there is the insistent urge to some form of consummation. In action there is no division between these two elements, except in time. There have been different theories concerned with the nervous centers involved and the manner in which these are aroused, but however interesting these theories may be in other connections, they do not directly concern us here.

Nature is slow to drop even the useless organs and movements; how much slower she would be in dispensing with elements as important as instincts! If we still retain vermiform appendices, five toes on a foot, hair, the sense of smell, and arm swinging, how much

INSTINCTS

more likely that we should retain such a fundamental possession as the instincts. Unless we cut ourselves off entirely from the animal world, after reading Fabre, Forel, Hingston, Huber, Wheeler, the Peckhams, and similar authors concerning the wonders of animal instincts, we cannot escape the conclusion that human beings must retain instincts as a part of their natural inheritance.

The truth of the matter is, of course, that instincts still persist as strongly in the human as in other animals, but that the ways of meeting and satisfying them have changed with altered conditions and demands. One can usually successfully predict the way in which instincts will manifest themselves in animals, but one does not know how they will be satisfied in human beings. Take, for example, the matter of obtaining food: contrast the methods of animals, of our early ancestors, and of people today. Starting from the methods of satisfaction, it would be difficult to trace them backward to the same instinct. We might be justified in thinking that if the animal method of obtaining satisfaction were caused by a certain instinct, something else must cause us to use our method. Can the work in a machine shop or in a department store or in a lawyer's office be caused by the same motive power as the stealthy prowling of a tiger in the jungle

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

or the quest of a robin on the lawn? It seems scarcely creditable!

Of course, it is always possible for us to revert to primitive methods of food-getting, but rarely very profitable. We can return to the woods and secure food by hunting, fishing, and gathering berries. Hunting and fishing have been most attractive forms of recreation. In fact, our recreations in these days, when our instinctive urges are principally satisfied by secondary means, revert to primary satisfactions. Beside hunting and fishing, we have only to call attention to sports like football, boxing, wrestling, and similar contests involving personal contact, in which, either personally as participants or vicariously as spectators, we like to indulge. Competition, collecting, love-making, and other things which attract, satisfy not one but several instincts, which fact is the basis of their interesting qualities.

Can it be possible that the pleasure principle of the psychoanalysts, and the pleasure motive of the hedonists are the result of crossed wires? Do we desire what is pleasant, or are the things pleasant which we desire? The instincts demand satisfaction, and the satisfaction of the instincts usually gives us pleasure. The instinctive urge is the motive power; the satisfaction of the instinct, with all its benefit to the individual and the race, is the result; the pleasure involved is simply a by-

INSTINCTS

product. It is true that in modern industry it has been found that certain by-products have become more valuable than the original product, but that is because through inexperience we did not know all the possibilities.

Nature does not work that way. Experience is her long suit—that is what she claims as a specialty. She is seeking instinctive satisfactions and what they carry with them; pleasure on the side is a dividend—but however large the dividend, still on the side! The carrying out of instinctive urges while usually pleasant, owing to local conditions may at times be disagreeable, but she successfully insists upon the performance whether or no. When it is pleasant we think of ourselves as nature's favorites; but even if it is unpleasant, the next time she insists upon its being done just the same. Fortunately the satisfaction of instinctive urges is not only a satisfaction, but normally carries with it a pleasurable emotional tone. The things are pleasant which we have an urge to do.

The war punctured our complacency and showed us that the veneer of civilization which intelligence was supposed to have spread over us was very thin. Shell shock proved to us that instinct was strong enough to defeat all the conventions which civilization had wrapped around us and which intelligence had invented. How many persons have testified to the effect of war experiences as that of quickly reducing them to

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

primitive conditions, and satisfying them with primitive activities? The war did not suddenly develop instincts, it suddenly revealed the strength of the instincts which was always present but which was not recognized. We are forgetting again!

In time of excitement and of lack of control, when intelligence is in abeyance and rational considerations are weakened—in other words, during such conditions as war generates—the satisfaction of instinctive urges tends to be primary, and consequently unusually conspicuous. This very conspicuousness causes some people to think of the satisfaction of instinctive drives as being only of a primary nature. If that were true, we should be right in thinking that the power of instinct in human lives is weakening. Primary satisfactions of instinctive acts are undoubtedly lessening, progress depends on their becoming continuously less.

The concept of instincts has covered much misinformation, but also much that was true or valuable. It may have been at times a name for ignorance and an excuse for a lack of investigation, but it could not have been these if it did not contain much of value to human life. Instinct is the contribution of the race to the individual and the insistence that the individual contribute to the race. Each instinct is a distinct piece of heredity peculiar to the species to which the individual belongs. Oliver Wendell Holmes said that

INSTINCTS

heredity is an omnibus in which all our ancestors ride, and every now and then one of them puts his head out and embarrasses us. If he were writing today he might use a different figure and say that very frequently one of them shows his presence by stepping on the gas. When he does that we know the meaning of instinct.

But what is the meaning of instinct? We have been talking about it very familiarly and have not yet defined it. That is a grave oversight, for a failure to agree on a definition is one of the reasons why psychologists have eschewed it. We have little doubt about the meaning of the word when applied to animals, and we should have as little doubt when applied to human beings. Its close relation to other human manifestations complicates our problem. We have, for example, an immediate connection with emotion—so close that some psychologists have designated a specific emotion to be attached to every instinct, as, e.g., the emotion of fear as an integral part of the instinct of flight, the emotion of anger as an integral part of the instinct of pugnacity. While this scheme works out well in the two examples given, unfortunately there are not enough specific emotions to go around, and some of the minor instincts seem to have few emotional concomitants. However, the scheme seems to have merit. The function of the specific emotion is apparently to reinforce

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

present impulse and subsequent interest. If the fulfillment of the satisfaction of the instinct is obstructed, the specific emotion may be reinforced by the emotion of anger.

We also find instinct closely related to habit, and after its first few expressions it may be modified and become habit, being carried on when the stimulus which initiates the instinct is lacking. We have, moreover, a very close relationship between human instinct and interest—we are always interested in actions concerned with instinct. Recognizing as we do the general nature of instinct, it may be an advantage if we do not try to give a specific definition. We know instinct to be a native urge to some complicated action or actions, together with native ability and capacity to carry out the action. Due to the modifications found in human instincts, they are often not so specific as in animals, and always show purpose working toward a definite end, now or formerly of use to the individual and the species to which he belongs.

In instinctive action the organism works as a unit. When dealing with instincts we usually have to do with long-sections rather than with cross-sections of activity. This has been the stumbling block of many investigators of instinctive activity; to scrutinize instincts microscopically was to lose them entirely, and naturally those with too great a flair for analysis failed,

INSTINCTS

and if the analysts, who had done so much to explain other experiences, failed, what could be expected of others? Unfortunately their strength proved their weakness. This was another reason why the chain-reflex concept went astray—there was too much stress laid upon the individual links of the chain, and this is one case where the chain was stronger than the individual links.

As to the number, we are less definite than concerning the definition. Almost every authority gives his own list and his own numbers. The psychoanalysts demand one or two, some others give three—food-getting, defense, and sex; McDougall wanted a dozen or more, James demanded forty, and Watson cannot get along with less than one hundred—“squirmings,” he calls them. The number manifestly is determined by the definition—and agreement on either is unlikely. Even if we succeeded in agreeing upon the words of a definition, there would undoubtedly be difference of opinion as to whether certain experiences were covered by these words. Complicated as the instincts are with the mixture of other factors, the fitting of the experience to the words is not easy, especially as the first elements in instinctive action are likely to be unrecognized if not unconscious. Notwithstanding this indefiniteness, what is meant by “instincts” is pretty well established in the minds of all.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

In the present use of the term "instinct," the widest meaning will be employed. No attempt will be made to differentiate it from innate tendencies, appetite, innate responses, unlearned activity, original nature, drive, urge, reflexes, or similar terms; no divisions such as specific and general, individual and social will be made. The word will be inclusive and the use general, as the illustrations will indicate.

P. S. Is it proper to add a postscript to a discussion of this kind? Perhaps not! However, the temptation to do so is so great as to overwhelm the impropriety of such an action. The fact of the matter is that after reading and considering so many definitions which do not seem quite to fit, the hope of framing a satisfactory one is certainly intriguing. What is the definition which so demands expression as to lead me into a procedure so irregular? It is this: "An instinct is an insistent but unlearned activity toward originally unrecognized ends, which is common to the species, and the consummation of which may be modified by experience."

Chapter II

INTELLIGENCE

INSTINCT is the most common type of animal adaptation. It was so adequate and so successful in its primary satisfactions in the insects—especially in the social insects, as, e.g., the bees and ants—that further development seemed unnecessary. Evidently this was not equally true in the human and related species. In biological economy the reason for the development of the intelligence was to satisfy the instinctive urge under conditions where primary satisfactions were difficult or impossible. This is the principal difference between instincts in animals and men: in animals there is one primary, direct satisfaction of instinctive urges; in men there is similar primary satisfaction, but in addition to this there are also secondary satisfactions provided by the intelligence. If the primary satisfaction is impossible or inadvisable, the secondary one is available.

This shows how important instinct really is in man: the urge must be satisfied! It also shows why psychologists have had so little assistance in the study of human instincts in experiments on animals—the

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

results of the experiments did not always apply. Most important of all, it shows that there is no antagonism between instincts and intelligence: the intelligence, in helping to satisfy instinctive urges, is supplementary to instinct—instinct is the motivating power.

The hope that we may, if, indeed, we have not already done so, reach the time when we shall realize "the primacy of the intelligence over the life of the instincts" is founded on an incorrect idea of the relationship which exists between the two. Instincts, which have been primary in biological development, must continue to be primary in time and in motive power; there is no opportunity for the usurpation of these functions by the intellect; the latter, however, in providing more numerous and more important secondary satisfactions may take a more prominent part in the whole of human life.

There is an idea abroad, that to act intelligently one must be free from emotional pressure, especially that connected with the instincts. Here again no provision is made for secondary satisfactions which the intelligence, and the intelligence only, can provide. It is true that intelligence cannot function efficiently after a primary satisfaction has become stimulated by the instinctive drive and the individual is aflame with the accompanying emotion, but we should recognize that instincts and their emotions are the motivating power

INTELLIGENCE

of intelligent action, most of which is exhausted by furnishing secondary satisfactions to instinctive drives.

We realize this when we speak of rationalizing. We used to think that we reasoned things out and then acted on the conclusion which our reason produced. Now we know that this is the apparent but not the real process. We are motivated by our instincts, we do things under the insistence of race experience covering thousands and perhaps millions of years, and if asked why, it is the duty of the intelligence to manufacture the reasons, and, not infrequently, to do this very successfully. The process is much like post-hypnotic suggestion: when he is hypnotized, the subject is told that ten minutes after he awakes he will turn the chair over and sit down on it. He awakens and remembers nothing of the suggestion. At the appointed time he turns the chair over and sits on it. He is asked why he did that, and he replies that he thought it would be more comfortable that way.

You ask me when conditions were such in the history of the human race that the instinctive urges could not be satisfied in the primary way. I do not know, but there are many times when they might have been so, for example, when conditions were changing rapidly, as during the four successive ice ages. Of course, the species could not have survived if primary satisfactions were impossible, but when urges were so in-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

sistent as they must have been to continue the species under most difficult conditions, secondary satisfactions, even of an elementary nature, must have been a relief.

But what is meant by secondary satisfactions due to the intelligence? The psychoanalysts have called them sublimations—an artificial and not a very good term. If, for example, I have an instinct of pugnacity—as all human beings have—I can satisfy it in a primary way by engaging in a rough and tumble fight with my neighbor when he injures me. I may also satisfy this instinct in a secondary way—due to intelligence—by fighting with the same neighbor on a public platform in a battle for civic righteousness.

My intelligence also aids the instinct in satisfying the urge in a primary way more efficiently. If I am to fight my neighbor, my intelligence can provide clubs, knives, guns, or poisons; and if I am to fight my neighbor nations, I add cannon, battleships, submarines, and airplanes. Thus the intelligence supplements and aids in the realization of instinctive urges in both primary and secondary satisfactions.

Social inheritance, due to speech and writing, both peculiar to man, has added much to the scope of possibilities of secondary satisfactions of instincts; and expanding intellectual power has enabled the individuals and communities to evaluate the desirability and possibility of satisfactions other than the primary

INTELLIGENCE

ones. The intellect has thus become a guiding and controlling agency but never a motivating power. The instinctive urge has been the moving force. Think in how many ways the pugnacious or food-getting or acquisitive instincts may be satisfied! It remains for the intellect to decide into which of these, other than the primary, the force shall be directed.

In our complex life in modern civilization we must realize that any individual line of conduct may satisfy not one but many instinctive urges. Love-making, for example, may satisfy sex, acquisition, pugnacity, and self-aggrandizement. It may be that this combination of instinctive urges accounts for the supposed strength of the sex urge. On the other hand, there may be many ways in which any instinctive urge may be satisfied besides the primary one, and advancing civilization and complexity of life will continually add to these.

The instinctive urge, satisfied in a primary way, assures the immediate success of a particular but limited end by a direct method. It is a short but sure step. The aim is completed and definitely closed—there is no sequel. When intelligence was introduced nature accepted a hazard. It is uncertain where the process will end, for every need satisfied is a basis for a new need. That is the way civilization advances: the luxuries of today become the necessities of tomorrow. There is no doubt but that intelligence performs the expected func-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

tion of satisfying instinctive urges in secondary ways, but it does not stop its work there; it opens up enticing new experiences in a world very different from the one in which instinct primarily reigned.

Another place where intelligence may and does aid is in saving us from the results of primary satisfactions which were once beneficial but, owing to changed conditions, are now injurious or, perhaps, of no value. This aid comes either by repressing the primary reaction or by directing the force into some other channel. We have all had the experience of having a dog suddenly bark at our heels. Instinctively we start to run—often to the great amusement of spectators. Of course, we cannot outrun the dog, the fact that we run entices the dog to chase and perhaps to bite us, and altogether this action which thousands of years ago might have saved our lives in the forest is detrimental on a city street today. We try to repress it, and after the first step endeavor to pretend that the step was taken for some other purpose, and that we were not afraid.

If he admits that man still has instincts, the ordinary person thinks that the instincts are absolutely under the control of the intelligence. Is not the individual master of his fate? Is he not captain of his soul? Perhaps the latter figure is a fortunate one: the captain directs. He does not design the ship, he does not provide the motive power. He trims the sails to direct the power,

INTELLIGENCE

or he steers the ship after the chief engineer fulfills his duty in furnishing the power. The intelligence directs the energy, the drive which is so characteristic of the instincts, and determines, within limits, whether the satisfaction shall be primary or which of the many secondary satisfactions shall be used. As the need of primary satisfactions increases, the power of direction into secondary satisfactions weakens, and in extreme cases is canceled entirely.

Would it be incorrect to say that instincts are concerned with ends, and the intellect with means of reaching these ends? That might be acceptable, although it is very different from our usual thought of the function of the intelligence. Certainly the instincts always have ends in view, and the urge to perform actions which will accomplish an end. The intelligence enters in the middle of this process, uses the urge which cannot well be repressed and deflects the power so that another result of somewhat the same general nature is accomplished, but which might be considered of more value to the individual. It is probably correct to add that the intelligence contributes a capacity for purposive action, not so rigid as the ends in view in instinct, which introduces a new factor in biology. This is most clearly seen in the form of rational ideals. It is because of this that it can provide necessary satisfactions, as well as contribute to the primary satisfactions of the instincts.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

On the other hand, it has already been pointed out how instinct controls the intelligence in forcing it to provide reasons for instinctive action and thus satisfy the individual. One can see a good illustration of this in the way in which the instinct may sway and control the intelligence by the prejudice shown in favor of one's own nation in time of defense, as when destruction is threatened in a war. At such times the instincts demand that the whole organism shall co-operate in providing primary satisfaction. Unfortunately the origin of human motives is not always, or usually, in one's immediate consciousness.

Why these intelligent substitutes satisfy the instinctive urge, we do not know, but we recognize the fact. We have an analogy to this in the Freudian conception of the disguised dream, which provides satisfaction to the subconscious urge and permits sleep. One advantage of this secondary satisfaction is that the instinctive urge is retained and encouraged. The instinctive urge is so strong and so ineradicable that it seems unlikely that it could ever be eliminated, but if, instead of secondary satisfactions, it were continually repressed and discouraged, it might eventually be eliminated to the detriment of the individual and the race.

Biological economy is most interesting. Pope expresses it in his characteristic way:

INTELLIGENCE

In human works, tho' labour'd on with pain,
A thousand movements scarce one purpose gain;
In God's, one single can its end produce;
Yet serves to second too some other use.

This last line tells the story: not an organ of the body but has a specific and primary function, yet each has one or more subsidiary functions. Fore limbs were originally for locomotion, but in human beings we have forgotten the original object in the multiplying of other uses to which they are now put. We still swing them in unison with the hind limbs, an instinctive action once of considerable value and probably of secondary value now in walking.

The intellect, developed to assist in satisfying instinctive urges, is not entirely occupied with this task and is developing other uses continually; but so long as instinctive urges are what they are and continue to be so insistent, the intellect has a full-sized task in completing its original function. Directing this driving force of instinct into channels which will minister to man's greatest progress is no small task; deciding which is the way of greatest progress is an avocation which makes a considerable demand on the intelligence.

Those who have made a study of the reactions of crowds or mobs are wont to tell us that when the mob spirit prevails, intellect is in abeyance and the individuals who compose the mob instantly slough off the

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

civilized veneer and revert thousands of years into the primitive days of human experience. The crowd, they say, never reasons, but acts impulsively on the suggestion of the leader, and never constructively but destructively. What does this mean but that the crowd is in such a condition that it is most susceptible to an appeal to the instincts, and an appeal which often finds its satisfaction in a primary manner?

A crowd may be any number, provided there are enough to satisfy the gregarious instinct, and it is this gregarious instinct which is the basis of crowd action. So we may see it exemplified in any combination from that of a jury in a courtroom to a nation at a federal election. In the presence of a homogeneous crowd, and a crowd tends toward homogeneity, it is difficult to establish an antagonistic individual opinion. The satisfaction of the gregarious instinct carries with it an insistence upon unity, and this unity is a unity of action. Nothing could so well be a basis for unified action as the instinct, the common possession of every member of the species. Intellect is a basis for individual opinion, instinct for united action.

Combined action is inevitably less intelligent than individual action, even when the combination cannot be classed as a psychological mob. To have combined action a certain amount of compromise and evening down of the high peaks is necessary, but the crowd ac-

INTELLIGENCE

tions are always simple and direct, and the crowd acts as an individual—an individual child. The lynching mob, the revival mob, the election mob, all show similar characteristics, as do also the college student mob, the crossword puzzle mob, or the Wall Street mob.

To the contagious influence of mob action all persons are liable. No one has so developed an individual mode of action as to consider himself to be immune under all circumstances. There seems to be an indefinable and unconscious method of communication which physical presence makes possible, but which manifests itself in psychological phenomena. It antedates civilized procedure and seems to be inexplicable on any civilized basis. It is instinctive and a part of instinctive procedure almost telepathic in nature, and somewhat uncanny to anyone who could possibly be an observer. Like other instinctive actions it is difficult to explain, but may be classed as a part of the gregarious instinct which has operated in the past to save the herd. Its end justifies the compelling nature of its influence on the individual.

It is this quick response and united action on meager information and slight stimuli which are called the suggestibility of the mob. Call it what you will, it acts with instinctive speed and certainty. The phenomena may be induced deliberately to achieve certain ends or they may be spontaneous, unrestrained, and unguided. It may achieve moral ends, though always in a destruc-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

tive way, but its spontaneous action is usually of such a character that if performed by an individual it would be considered immoral. To achieve moral ends it must be intelligently guided.

The mob always has a leader. In religious gatherings it is likely to be the preacher, in political mobs it is the politician, and in war the officer. It must be some one who by virtue of office or by virtue of personality is given or assumes the right to lead—the natural leader being much more efficient than the artificial one. All animal herds have leaders, sometimes the chance one of the pine processionary or at other times the natural one of the strongest buffalo bull. It may not be incorrect to say that it is the leader who is the necessary factor in changing a group of individuals into a psychological crowd. It is he, at least, who gives the signals to which the others instinctively respond. These signals may be words, certain inarticulate natural or artificial sounds, or actions; but when given, the response has all the earmarks of instinctive action. His assumption of leadership may be as spontaneous as the following of the crowd, or it may be deliberately attempted. The following on the part of the individuals comprising the crowd may be rationalized or it may be as inexplicable to them as to the observer or reviewer. Perhaps in our modern life we may have no better example of instinctive action than the stampede of the mob, as commu-

INTELLIGENCE

nities or whole nations are swayed with catastrophic suddenness.

Reason is a biologically late production in the individual and in the race. It has not yet become thoroughly ingrained in our natures and we do not use it unless forced to do so. Thinking is hard work! On account of its late development it is still unstable, and any excitement or strain causes us to cast it aside and to depend upon the functions which are as bone and sinew to us, because of their age-long benefit and use. The instability of the individual in the crowd, the instability of the individual in any time of pressure, or when either temporary or permanent deterioration has set in, forces us to rely not on intelligence but on the instincts, for the law of degeneration is that the latest developed functions are the first to go, and the earliest developed functions the last to desert us.

Chapter III

MORALS

INSTINCTS are the driving power of all native activities, and without them these abilities would be without force or meaning. Because of the activity of the intellectual abilities in man, these instinctive drives may be directed away from the bestial levels which primary satisfactions demand and into which their untrammelled course would lie, into other and, we think, more exalted channels. It is because of this fact that we can have morals.

We deny moral actions to animals because they have not sufficient intelligence to develop secondary satisfactions for instinctive urges, and consequently cannot direct the instinctive energy along higher levels. They have no choices: the instinctive urge means one thing to them, and that gives a unique and direct result. We train them so that habit may take the place of instinct in redirecting the energy, but this direction comes from outside, not from within. The more intelligent an animal the more chance there is for training in secondary satisfactions, or in emphasizing one instinctive satisfaction rather than another.

When we examine the content of our moral concep-

MORALS

tions we shall find that instead of there being antagonism between instincts and morals, the latter are founded upon the former and really dependent upon them. It is this combination of instincts and intelligence, which we have found quite congenial and advantageous, that makes morals possible. Certainly we only find a moral life where there is this combination.

What, then, do we mean by morals? Morals consist of two factors. In the first place there is the satisfaction of instinctive urges in a primary way in conformity to the mores of the community in which one lives. This, of course, will differ widely in different communities and among different people. Take for example the pugnacious urge: if a marauder were to enter my home and attack my wife and children it would be perfectly moral, in fact, commendable, for me to attack him in the most primitive way, with hands and feet and teeth, with any weapon I could lay my hands upon with no regard to London Prize Ring rules. On the other hand, to attack a neighbor whom I met on the street and who arouses my anger by refusing to pay me the dollar he borrowed from me would be opposed to the customs of our bucolic village and consequently be looked upon as immoral and worthy of the gravest condemnation.

It might be contended that primary instinctive actions are neither moral nor immoral, but unmoral, because of their somewhat automatic nature. This is un-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

doubtedly true in animals; we consider their instinctive actions as possessing no more moral factor than their digestive processes. When, however, secondary satisfactions are introduced in human beings, the element of choice appears and the moral factor is injected.

But there is another and more characteristic factor in our moral life. This is the satisfaction of the instinctive urge in secondary ways. This we usually think of as the basis of real moral action. If instead of my satisfying my pugnacious instinct in a primary way, whether or not approved by my neighbors, I enter a campaign in which I give all my energy, money, and, if necessary, my life for some altruistic purpose, such as the freeing of slaves, the stamping out of epidemic disease, or the rehabilitation of crippled children, and thus satisfy this instinct in this secondary way, it would generally be considered a more moral and worthy act.

Into such a campaign as is suggested would enter all the elements of battle; the strategy would have to be planned with greatest care and consideration for all the existing elements or forthcoming exigencies. The opposition would probably be personalized and his wiles anticipated; all the fighting forces, resources, and possible allies would be secured and assigned to duty; an intelligence service directed to ascertain the moves of the enemy would be organized; every effort would be made to prevent forces from being secured by the op-

MORALS

position, and personal encounter on the public platform or in private argument would be a part of the method. Only a fighter could succeed, and the fighting instinct would have full sway.

Such a campaign would, to be sure, satisfy more than my pugnacious instinct, but the point in question is that that particular urge is satisfied in this secondary way. There would also be different ways or different degrees of quality, but in general the more vigorous the fight and the more altruistic the aim, the higher moral quality could be attached to the act.

Our present ideas concerning morals make it very difficult to think of moral actions without some altruistic factors. We find different moralists assigning to different instincts the credit for altruism. With one it is the gregarious instinct, with another the paternal, with another the sex. While undoubtedly these instincts do augment the altruistic factor in human conduct, altruism goes back much further than any of them. When the first living cell divided to form two cells, when it gave up its life for two others we have the beginning of altruism. The biologist may object by informing us that the reason for the division was that the cell became so large that the envelope could not provide nourishment for all the cell and it was forced to divide. Very well! Then altruism is in the very nature of living matter—an integral part of life. If so, it is only natural that

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

it should show itself in certain of our instincts and be counterbalanced by other instincts of a selfish nature in order that the individual life should be saved long enough to contribute to the race.

Life seems to consist of a series of balances, like a boy riding a bicycle. We stand because one set of muscles pulls against the other; if either should give way we should fall backward or forward. The heart beats at a certain pace, and the blood vessels are expanded a certain amount because of the contrary stimulation of sets of nerves. If either nerve stimulation failed the other would overfunction to our detriment. Instincts seem to be similarly balanced; self-sacrifice works against self-indulgence, flight against curiosity, pugnacity against altruism. If we are free to choose a line of conduct, it probably is carried out by the inhibition of one instinct or set of instincts to give the other an opportunity to express itself more fully, or, perhaps, what amounts to the same thing, we decide on the stimulation of the chosen instinct.

Instinct, in limiting man's development to certain evolutionary paths, may be a distinct disadvantage as well as an advantage—it surely is in the insects—but in man intelligence comes to the rescue, and not only gives the impression of itself as a new and intrusive force, but actually proves itself to be such. Life is vastly broader and more inclusive because of the introduction of this

MORALS

new element. It is not that instinct is defeated and killed by it, but it is enabled to reach a higher fruition. In the ascetic the sex instinct is not defeated, and in the martyr that of self-preservation is not destroyed. These instincts have not been abolished, but their energy has been turned into channels of newer and higher character.

Some of the greatest fighters have never handled a sword or wielded a battle ax. Some of the most valiant warriors have never smelled powder—have never commanded a platoon or a battalion or an army. Some, whose pirate ancestors have won fame by their skill with a cutlass in a boarding party on the high seas, are now satisfying their fighting and acquisitive instincts as Wall Street pirates, showing equal skill, resourcefulness, and valor in financial battles where fortune, reputation, and even life may be at stake. The greatest victories of the world have not been won on bloody battlefields. Luther and Galileo, Huss and Bunyan, John Brown and John B. Gough were all bonnie fighters. As we see Luther throwing an ink bottle at the devil, we see a courageous duelist spoiled to make a militant theologian. Those were tough old days when there were ink bottles and when there were devils; the days of fountain pens do not produce such rugged protagonists! Intelligence steps in and turns our fighting into more profitable channels—or should.

In days gone by, morals, and religion, too, for that

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

matter, specialized in negation. The moral code consisted principally in a list of actions which one must not perform. I suppose that is one factor which contributed to the unpopularity of the moralists. Children were, but I hope no longer are, brought up on don'ts. "Sarah, go see what Willie is doing and tell him to stop it," was the parental order. When Willie stopped that he probably got into more serious mischief. Suppose we simply repress the primary satisfaction of instinctive urges, what happens then? We may liken the process to the damming of the stream which, if it has no directed outlet, soon overflows its banks and destroys men and cattle and houses and factories. But if guided through a penstock to exert its force against a turbine engine, it produces light and heat and power for the benefit of mankind. Intelligence must direct the irrepressible energy of instinct into useful channels in the really moral life.

The lesson which morals has contributed to civilization is that we should employ instincts and not simply repress them, and intelligence enables us to do this. After all, what we mean by morals is a code for an intelligent method of living together. The intellect sets a limit to the extent of primary satisfactions, and consequently there ensues a constant change and, in general, a refinement in the mores of the community and the morals of the individual. Our moral sense seems to

MORALS

have grown out of a resolution of the conflict between the primary satisfactions of the individual and the secondary satisfactions which society permits or demands. Individual motivation formed a *mélange* with the restraints of society, with this beneficial result.

It could hardly be expected that the result would always be beneficial. The instinct of flight, which was probably the means of saving individuals and species in prehistoric times, may be detrimental in modern days. We have ceased, except in exceptional cases, to participate in physical flight and the substitute has not helped. Our idea of a moral act is to face a difficulty and to solve it, but flight is so easy today! The reason why persons drink alcohol habitually is to flee from their problems. Flight, in the form of recreation, may be beneficial in bringing us back to our problem in better condition for its solution than when we left it; but not so the flights which have nothing in their favor but flight. Certain forms of insanity are undoubtedly forms of flight, and suicide a most efficient form.

In our study of morals, there is one element which the philosophers insist upon and like to emphasize. This is what Kant called the categorical imperative, but which we know in less technical language as "the ought feeling." Not only are there certain lines of conduct which we decide are highly desirable from a moral standpoint, but with this decision comes the insistence

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

that we should perform them. Many philosophers speak of this as unique, and on this account set moral action off in a category quite separate from other action.

Just what is this categorical imperative? Well, if we were to liken it to any psychological phenomenon we might think of it as quite similar to an instinctive urge. We have good reason for this comparison, for that is just what it is. The intelligence has given us secondary or tertiary methods of satisfying the instinctive urges which, as already explained, are the basis of our higher moral ideas; but, having given us these, the action is not completed. The instinct insists upon satisfaction, and this insistence on instinctive satisfaction in this higher, that is, moral, way is the categorical imperative. It has not been previously so recognized, because we did not understand that moral actions were secondary instinctive satisfactions, but with this understanding the insistence on action and this particular action is not difficult to explain. An instinctive act is distinguished by the one experiencing it as right, inevitable or necessary, and obvious, and the result is a feeling of satisfaction. Are not these the characteristics of the categorical imperative?

The objection frequently made to "conscience" as a native element in man is that whatever impelling force there is, is directed by different individuals in different ways. The head hunter in Borneo considers that he

MORALS

ought to secure the head of his enemy, the modern man in occidental civilization thinks that that is just the action which he should not take. The "that" of moral obligation seems to be universal, the "what" varies with individuals and communities. We can readily see why this is: the instinct with its urge for satisfaction is common to the species, the way this shall be satisfied depends upon the intelligence, and the intelligent method of satisfying the instinct depends upon the education and the social and economic conditions which have surrounded the individual in the community in which he has been reared.

Some experiments made on the homing instinct of pigeons and bees seem to prove that it is the "that" of instinct rather than the "what" which is native. Pigeons, kept confined so as to be unable to become acquainted with the territory adjacent to their cotes, when taken but a short distance away and released were unable to find their way home. Because the method of fulfillment, in some cases, at least, is a matter of experience, we can more easily understand why the "what" of morals depends so completely on the education of the individual.

The moralists have always insisted that ethics deal with values, and that is undoubtedly true. Theoretically they decide what is best (right) to do under certain circumstances. The legitimacy of these values depends

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

upon the functioning of the intellect; whether the best, or any, act is ever performed depends upon the functioning of the instincts. The instincts are unmoral; morals only appear with the intelligence, for the latter, alone, can decide on values.

It can undoubtedly be asserted that the highest individual morals in a community are superior to its mores; we may even say that the individual morals are superior to the community morals. This is because the individual intelligence is usually of a higher order than the intelligence of the mob. Individual intelligence always leads general intelligence, and the community may even brag about doing things which in the individual would cause the deepest shame. Individuals will devise instinctive satisfactions which the community will not in general adopt for scores of years. So much are morals dependent upon the individual that they can in a general way be charted to run a parallel course with the intelligence of the individuals and the community.

We can now understand why the effect of traumatic injury to the brain, or that of alcohol and other poisons, shows itself in moral deterioration. This is true whether the effect is temporary or permanent. The unstable character of intelligence, owing to its late development, makes it particularly liable to disarrangement. Without the moral functioning of intelligence we have no secondary satisfactions of instinctive urges, and the in-

MORALS

instinctive urges can only find their satisfaction in primary ways. Thus the alcoholic is charged with "making a beast of himself," which, I suppose, is literally true. On the other hand, the saying, "What a man is when he's sober will manifest itself when he is drunk," is not literally true. When intoxicated, his inhibitions are weakened so that he cannot prevent primary satisfactions and allow the instincts to find outlets in other ways, but in addition to that, the other ways are not provided by the intelligence. When sober, however, he has the use of intelligence which makes him very different from his intoxicated condition.

Chapter IV

RELIGION

RELIGION is man's highest reach. During the late war and after, many persons, especially among youth, were enamored of Donald Hankey's definition. He said, "Religion is betting your life there is a God." That is only shoulder high to the real reach which man has made. Religion is betting your life that you are a god, that is how high man has stretched himself. And how has he attained this height? Simply by the ideational fulfillment of his instinctive urges.

Yes, that is what religion is, the ideational fulfillment of instinctive urges. There can, therefore, be no antagonism between instinct and religion, for there could be no religion without instincts. Religion represents the highest product of the combination of instinct and intelligence, the most human result of man's highest faculties. Viewing religion in this way, we can readily understand why those interested in the philosophy of religion have at times spoken of it as the result of a specific instinct—"the instinct of religion," they called it. While this in itself was incorrect, we find religion based on all the power and drive of the

RELIGION

combined instinctive forces, and thus so closely related to instinct as to make the mistaken explanation an excusable one.

Freud speaks of culture as compensation for instinctive renunciation, and tells us that religious ideas are the most important part of the psychical inventory of culture. Of course, he has missed the point! One might think that he had never heard of sublimation! Far from religion's providing compensation for instinctive renunciation, religion, to the contrary, provides for instinctive satisfaction more fully than any other human experience. It is true that the satisfaction is not of a primary character, but it is real and it is complete.

No one could claim that religion, as we know it today, has only instinctive elements in it. In satisfying the drives of instinct it has laid claim to all kinds of human experiences down through the ages, and is doing so today. In tracing our religion one person may emphasize one form of human activity as an element in religion and another person may lay stress on another, but the motive power back of all these, and the power which combines them into an uncontradictory whole is the drive of the instincts. Religion is near the source of life.

We have already seen that in morals, in addition to secondary satisfactions of instinctive urges, there are primary ones as well; but in religion the latter are

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

eliminated or, at least, should be. When religion has failed there has not been the careful discrimination between primary and secondary satisfactions. That was where Paul had trouble with the churches. We recognize that he made this distinction very clear. He speaks about the flesh (primary satisfactions) and the spirit (secondary, ideational satisfactions). To be carnally minded was death, to be spiritually minded was life and peace.

Of course, the trouble did not stop when Paul wrote his epistles to the churches. All through the ages the primary satisfactions have been intruding themselves into religion. Love which should be pure and spiritual insisted at times upon being carnal. The writings of some of the saints of the Middle Ages clearly show that primary satisfactions were not entirely eliminated—the phraseology of divine love is very carnal at times. Camp meeting practices, the bundling perfectionists, and numerous other historical data show the feet of clay.

In his progressive journey, man has been engaged in a continuous struggle against a tendency to satisfy his instincts in a primary way. It is this tendency which gives us war. This unsettled conflict between the deep-seated and elemental bias toward primitive satisfactions whose demands are immediate, and the ideationally proposed worths of a remoter and more uncertain na-

RELIGION

ture which religion promises, are typified by Jesus' temptation in the wilderness, and are continually experienced by every person who has permitted religion to disturb his Cro-Magnon mentality. In times of great pressure the battle may be lost, but it never stays lost; the upward push is never completely destroyed.

Morals and religion, which both deal primarily in secondary satisfactions, are usually combined. The primary satisfactions which morals permit are dictated by community opinion and regulation, and morals give a limit to what the religious person is permitted to do. On the other hand, religion furnishes the sanctions to morals, providing an authority and a compulsion which even the categorical imperative cannot furnish, perhaps by its comprehension of all the instincts. Thus while religion itself does not deal with primary satisfactions it reaches them through the attached moral life.

I am afraid that some persons may think our definition of religion equally applicable to some other forms of human experience. Might not that be a definition of insanity as well? Some forms of insanity, as, for example, dementia praecox, are ideational satisfactions of the instincts, but there is this difference: the religionist continually employs the regulating power of intelligence, while the insane refuse to allow intelligence to interfere with their ideal satisfactions. Religion

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

must be reasonable, insanity has no such limits. Of course, there has always been and always will be a difference of opinion as to what is reasonable.

Intelligence is not simply regulative and directive in religion but makes many other combinations. Naturally connected with the ideal satisfactions of instincts comes the answer to many questions with which the intelligence is confronted. Intimately joined to the instinct which some think of as "the will to power" is the question of world power and creation, and certain virtues or attributes, impossible to us, religion predicates to or demands of its god; the relation which the religionist has to his god as follower, heir, or son, gives him vicarious satisfaction. Many other philosophical questions with which the intelligence wrestles are combined with the instinctive urges, and a united solution and satisfaction ensue. The instinctive urge designated as "the will to live" combines with the philosophical question of the immortality of the soul, and the united and reciprocal influences of instinct and intelligence give us the doctrine generally accepted by the church.

The belief in regard to such a subject as immortality follows lines already indicated concerning the wide acceptance of the general belief, with wide divergence of detail influenced by the education, need, and wish of the particular people, which in turn are influenced

RELIGION

by the economic condition, climatic environment, and historical demands. These may vary from the Nirvana of the Hindu, the Happy Hunting Grounds of the American Indian, and the Houri of the Mohammedan to the highest Christian conception of eternal life. Heaven satisfies many instinctive urges which we cannot satisfy here. Already there have been mentioned the will to power and will to live which may thus be satisfied, and in addition we have the acquisitive instinct, satisfied in the riches of heaven, with its golden streets and gates of pearl and walls of precious stones; the gregarious instinct is satisfied in a most thorough way by companionship with God, angels, saints, and those whom we knew and loved here; safety and comfort, in the never-ending joy and rest; and thus through the whole list of instincts.

I may be wrong, but I do not think so, when I say that heaven is not so near as it used to be, or so certain. It is surely not so near to those who placed it just above the mundane universe. Some people who are unable to locate it exactly are doubtful of its existence at all. This is a distinct religious loss, because for those who lacked things here, heaven provided better things in great abundance. I wonder if all the grandiose schemes for old-age abundance with which this country is now flooded are not compensation for the uncertainty or loss of celestial security. They might well be!

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

But it was ever thus:

Hope springs eternal in the human breast:
Man never is, but always to be blest:
The soul uneasy and confin'd from home,
Rests and expatiates in a life to come.

The wants and desires of today are fully satisfied in the future which man plans for himself. Describe a man's heaven, and you can readily list his present needs, or, at least, his desires. The Messianic hopes of the Jews show the longings of an oppressed people. The Messiah was to be an ideal king whose every thought and action would be in accord with the will of God, for God was their friend and He had chosen them as a people upon whom to bestow favors; only the wickedness of their rulers had prevented their being the recipients of unbounded benefits. Through him, God would, therefore, make good all His promises, and all nations would recognize and acclaim them as God's chosen people. He would execute vengeance on all God's enemies, which meant, of course, the enemies of the Jews, and gather together the dispersed of Israel, and reign for a long time in a state of peace and plenty.

The idea of the Kingdom of God was not unlike this and was coupled with the Old Testament theocracy. This was the keynote of the preaching of John the

RELIGION

Baptist, but he emphasized less the political aspects than he did the spiritual. However, this did not take so well, for even the disciples could not escape from the idea of political salvation. Cleopas, while walking to Emmaus after Jesus' death, expressed his disappointment by saying, "But we hoped that it was He which should redeem Israel." Jesus was presented as the center and ruler of the kingdom which had a local and political phase as well as the spiritual.

The early Christians were of the lower class. They were oppressed by the aristocratic and middle class of their own people. The Sadducees were among the aristocrats and did not believe in the resurrection, but the great mass of the people needed a future life to compensate for their lack on earth. They were also oppressed and controlled by the Romans. Under these circumstances we can better understand the eschatological schemes and Messianic hopes of these early followers of Jesus, some of which are portrayed in the Revelation of St. John the Divine. The circumstances of the people are clearly traced down through the centuries by means of the various ideas of heaven or their interpretation of the meaning of salvation.

One of the ideals of salvation which has persisted tenaciously through the centuries is that of the millennium as portrayed in the twentieth chapter of the Revelation. In this plan, Jesus was to return to earth and

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

reign for one thousand years. During this time there should be peace on earth and abundance for everyone, and the resurrected saints should reign with Him. There should be a new heaven and a new earth in which dwelt righteousness. This doctrine is still popular among underprivileged groups.

While these religious projects have been flourishing more or less, there have never been wanting more mundane plans usually of a political nature. Plato in his *Republic*, More in his *Utopia*, Bellamy in his *Looking Backward* presented their ideal societies, and now it is the communists! A communist is a socialist without a sense of humor. By communism I am making no reference to Russia, for there the benefits were only intended to apply to a minority of the people; there was no voluntary system, but simply a dictatorship, or an oligarchy, proposing to be benevolent in its aims.

Real communism is supposed to be a classless society with the rule in everyone's hands, absolute justice prevails, and the universal goodwill permits a more or less general *laissez faire*. It entails a share the wealth and a two or three hours a day's work, with luxury in every home and peace everywhere. Best of all, it has been tried: "And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and soul: and not one of them said that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common. For neither was there

RELIGION

among them any that lacked: for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, and laid them at the apostles' feet; and distribution was made unto each, according as anyone had need. And Joseph, who by the apostles was surnamed Barnabas, a Levite, a man of Cyprus by race, having a field, sold it, and brought the money, and laid it at the apostles' feet. And a certain man named Ananias—" Ah! There's the trouble! There is always an Ananias! There are always myriads of Ananiases and Sapphiras!

I have never been the least concerned about communism as an ultimate; the personal, acquisitive instinct is too strong to permit this scheme to be anything more than a flurry. Did not Russia have to restore personal profit to get tasks accomplished? Persons will work hard for themselves, not so hard for members of their family, less hard still for the community, and when it comes to working for the state the work is so attenuated that it has largely petered out, and one is scarcely able to stand up and lean on a shovel. Dictatorship is always a threat, but communism never, so long as the present instincts endure—say, for the next ten thousand years.

The Crusades, pogroms, and inquisitions show the church satisfying its pugnacious urges in a primary way—this is not religion—and the battles for social right-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

eousness show the church satisfying its pugnacious urge in a moral war. The individual battles against sin—sometimes personalized as the devil—show the church in its conflict in an ideal, i.e., a religious way. Jesus' doctrine of nonresistance was an attempt to inhibit primary satisfactions in favor of ideal ones. Paul caught the idea and continually preached it. "For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places."

The charge has frequently been made by different persons that religion developed from this or that one human factor. At one time it is fear, at another sex, at another gregariousness, and so on through nearly all the list of emotions or instincts. If they were not exclusive in their opinions they would all be correct. Religion has developed from all the instincts, though probably in one age one aspect has been predominant, and in another age another. Religion is too comprehensive to be circumscribed or limited to any one factor.

Man in his upward climb has always had many problems, and at times he has been sorely pressed with difficulties. One of his chief problems has been that of safety, and many instincts have contributed to help him achieve this. Chief among them has been the instinct of flight, with the accompanying emotion of fear. Man

RELIGION

has had more things to fear than animals have. When he partially eliminated the dangers of the physical world and learned better how to adapt himself to his physical environment, he was faced with the problem of a mental world, of which animals know nothing, and to which he must adapt himself. These mental problems are his chief concern today, from some of them he flees, from others he obtains ideal satisfaction through his religious life. This is one of the chief benefits of religion, that he can flee from his troubles, and it is also one of his chief aids in the solution of them. Of course, he has fears; of course, he indulges in flight in his religious experiences, but in such a way as to be able to view his problems in a detached manner, which enables him to solve them more intelligently. Obviously, his most effective and satisfactory escape from his problems is by intelligently solving them.

But all must meet problems, at times, which are insoluble, insoluble so far as our limited ability is concerned. Can religion help here? Indeed it can, as many people can testify. Resignation or trust in God or Christian fortitude is an outstanding virtue which religion claims. With the belief in a future life, and in a particular future life attractive to the believer in which rewards and blessings are a prominent factor, death has no terrors for the devotee. In those insoluble problems, in which death is not an immediate prospect, the as-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

surance based on identity with the Deity and the inclusion and agreement of our plans with His, make uncomfortable conditions much more easy to endure.

Some religious experiences are undoubtedly developed from man's fears, but to say that religion is wholly or chiefly the result of fears is to misunderstand the nature of religion. Ceremonies may have been developed to obtain the companionship of deity, and as a form of defense and safety, but at the same time other instincts were being satisfied by this means, notably those of self-abasement and self-assertion. In fact, in religious, as in other experiences, it is difficult to find any act which does not simultaneously satisfy many instincts.

We have previously referred to the balance of the instincts, where two instincts pull or push in opposite directions, and a well-adjusted life keeps the pointer at zero. Two well-known and somewhat antagonistic elements are recognized in most religions, as well as in most attitudes toward life. We may call them self-assertion and self-abnegation, we may speak of them as adventure and comfort; in religion we think of them as typified by the prophet and the priest. One grasps for the new and the better, the other depends upon the fine things which the past has proved. Of course, the balance here as elsewhere is the ideal. Not all new things are good and not all old things are outmoded;

RELIGION

not all new things are bad and not all old things are good. We must call on the intellect to prove the good whether new or old.

We must not think of religion as simply satisfying instinctive urges ideally in a passive way; the action is not or should not be taken up by ceremonials and similar acts, the force of which is exhausted in the process. The instinctive urge reaches beyond the ideal satisfaction. Coupled as it is with morals, there is thus a borrowed or combined urge, and besides this there are certain actions which are incumbent upon one on account of his connection with deity, and also arising from the fact that he is deity. No examples can be presented which show greater energy, devotion, and self-sacrifice than those concerned with religion.

Of course, if religion is the satisfying of man's instinctive urge in an ideal way, it is to be expected that his religion will be anthropomorphic, but of such a character that the finer qualities will be emphasized. Naturally his god will be like him—but like him at his best. What better can he find for his ideal presentation? The qualities, possessed by the deity in which one believes, betray the highest ideal which the individual possesses. To turn the antithesis on Pope's line, "An honest God is the noblest work of man." What is true of his god is true of all his other religious conceptions. What attracts us most to Jesus is that His character,

where
8?
77-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

His ideal conceptions, presented to us a so much higher quality of religion, a so much more exalted idea of God, than had been presented before. His description of God was an index to the character of Jesus rather than that of God, and what we have hoped is that God would be as good as Jesus' conception of Him, that is, as good as Jesus.

Sabatier said that man is incurably religious. Inevitably so, because man is incurably instinctive. The basis of his religion is fundamental in human nature, and can never be eradicated. Under these circumstances he can never outgrow either his need for religion or his demand for the expression of himself through religion. The need will be constant, but the form of expression will naturally change through the ages, becoming, as we have noticed in the past, less concerned with primary satisfactions and more idealized and more refined as man advances in intelligence.

Because our religion consists of the ideational satisfactions of our instinctive urges, does that mean that there is no reality corresponding to these ideals? Far from it! Does the scientist reason that way? He believes that there is reality corresponding to his ideals, and talks about this reality as familiarly as he does about his breakfast. In both cases the constructive imagination combines with the intelligence to produce the ideals, and so the scientist talks about atoms and protons

RELIGION

and electrons and positrons with as much assurance as he talks of mountains and lakes and stars. It is true that he has never seen an atom or a proton, and he has never seen anyone who has, but he believes that they are there. By the same token, when he turns his ideational faculties in the direction of religion he is as sure of God and immortality and righteousness. He has seen photographs showing tracks of what he believes were rapidly moving protons and so he infers that there are such entities as protons, but when he moves from the observational point of view to that of the inferential he is in the same position as the religionist who reasons from facts to causes. Perhaps in neither case may reality exist; the contention is that he is as sure of one as of the other, and if there are limitations of certainty in religion there are equal limitations in science, and in both cases reality is a probability.

The real religionist is a thoroughly integrated individual. Having his instinctive urges satisfied ideally, he has no trouble having them all satisfied. No complexes, no repressions becloud his mind or disturb his nervous balance, he is satisfied and calm. The characteristic joy and calm of the person who gives himself up to religious experiences betray the unity of the spirit. No more divided self, no more contesting emotions, no more warring impulses, for the peace which passeth understanding has come into his life.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Some psychoanalysts might remind us at this point that unconscious impulses may consist of some other factors than instinctive urges, and in order to have perfect integration these also must be cared for. For this and other reasons, some would affirm that no one has yet achieved perfect integration. However, there seems to be agreement upon one aspect of the subject, viz., that the original demands of the "conscious rational" and the "unconscious emotional" are generally in conflict, and the demands made for the satisfaction of the two differ widely. Integration can only take place by the dominance of one or the other; we must either lower the "ego ideal" to the level of the instincts, or guide the expression of the instincts toward the attainment of the "ego ideal." The former solution might mean integration but degeneration, the latter combines integration and progress and is the solution which religion proposes.

Unfortunately, in the past, the solution proposed and recommended by some of those interested in religion was the repression of instinctive urges. That was fatal to integration and often ended in some abnormal mental condition, as the energy of the repressed instinct found expression along other channels. On the other hand, when the force of the instincts was directed and was expended toward the realization of the highest

RELIGION

life purposes, then it became of inestimable value and contributed to a harmonious and forceful personality.

The very fact that the psychoanalysts, who seem to lay so much emphasis on the unconscious elements and have called attention to their influence and power in our everyday life, not only recognize the presence of rational ideals but demand the dominance of an ideal principle in order to have a healthy and an integrated life, makes a place for religion in daily living and calls for the exercise of religious principles as a factor in life in its best and truest form. It is the ideational satisfaction of the instincts which provides religion with its characteristic satisfactions, and results in the perfect or near-perfect integration.

It is also this integration through the satisfaction of instinctive urges which makes religion of so much value in establishing and maintaining mental balance. Under the protection of intellectual sanctions, persistent drives which otherwise might wreck mental equilibrium are eased and discharged. It is true that religion has been charged, at times, with exciting mental instability; in most cases, at least, the religious delusions are symptoms rather than causes, and religious practices and ideals are much more likely to soothe than to excite. When people do not recognize the possibility of or desire the satisfaction of ideationalizing their instincts, and the community or family mores do not permit

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

satisfactions of a crasser kind, complexes and conflicts are likely to result, with a consequent lack of emotional equilibrium. That is why religion does not solve the problem of maladjustment for all.

This ideational satisfaction of instincts which we find in religion seems to have ministered to the necessities of human welfare, if we are justified in drawing this conclusion from its universality in time and place, and I think we are. Many social values can be attributed to religion, but I judge the most potent survival value is to be found in its contribution to individual life. To relieve the tension, caused by an ungratified instinctive drive, would undoubtedly be of value, if in no other way than by permitting undivided attention and complete mental functioning to necessary duties and occupations which were calling for action. Whatever the reason, the fact of survival value seems to be outstanding.

Chapter V

SIN

IN ANY study of the relation of instincts and religion it seems difficult to escape some reference to the subject of sin. In the minds of not a few people sin and the expression of instincts are practically synonymous, especially among those to whom the word "sin" is connected with only one instinct. Most of us have, at best, only a very indefinite idea of the meaning of the word, and, sometimes, I fear, the more we try to define it, the more hazy the meaning becomes.

It is not unnatural that there should be a very vague distinction among many between what is sinful, immoral, and criminal. Perhaps the criminal is more clearly differentiated from the others. I suppose we all realize that to dispose of garbage in certain ways, to spit on the sidewalk, or to discharge a gun within the village limits is an infraction of the village laws and consequently criminal; that to drive an automobile beyond a certain speed or to fish without a license is an infraction of the state laws and therefore criminal; and to hunt migratory birds or to retain gold coins is an infraction of the laws of the United States and accord-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

ingly criminal; but no one would think of these things as being sinful. Performing these acts might not be an expression of good citizenship, but they would not be sinful.

The distinction between immorality and sin is less easy to make, largely because religion has comprehended most, if not all, moral laws within its own code. The Ten Commandments of Moses are usually referred to as the Moral Law, but the first two commandments do not deal with morals, while most of the others do, though any infraction of any of them would usually be reckoned as sin. Several of them, as for example, stealing and killing, would be considered sinful, immoral, and criminal, although under certain circumstances they might be properly classed as none of these. The way the commandment covering the Sabbath is interpreted today by many may be criminal and sinful but not immoral, and coveting may be sinful but not criminal or immoral.

What is criminal, immoral, or sinful is largely a matter of geography and chronology. Time and place make a vast difference. Compare, if you will, Boston today with Boston of 1639. Three centuries change definitions! Or compare the United States with Central Africa. A number of years ago when there was a theological seminary as a part of Colgate University, some students entered the seminary from the South. All the

SIN

students were studying for the Baptist ministry, but the Southern students could not understand how students for the ministry could conscientiously dance, while the Northern students were as much mystified concerning the consistency of the ministry with smoking. I understand both are standard practice today.

There is little doubt but that economic and social conditions have much to do with these definitions and distinctions. One looks back upon conditions along the coast of Great Britain when people publicly prayed for wrecks, and the appropriating of goods from a wrecked ship was not considered stealing but the cargo was received as a gift from God who sent the storm and drove the ship on the rocks. In the early days of pioneering in our own West, horse stealing was a capital offense. The reason was, of course, that a man's life often depended upon his horse. Today at the very spot where a horse thief was left hanging on a limb to give him a chance to think it over, there may be no horses to steal, and a horse might be more of a liability than an asset. Denver was one of the first cities to deny the use of its streets to horses.

In the minds of some, the rules, ordinances, laws, and prescripts of the church should be obeyed, and any departure from them would be sin. These might be directions for time and place for saying prayers, the matter of contributions, the time of eating and the foods

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

of which one can partake, and other rules which have little or nothing to do with sin. Consequently, the unfaithful churchman may be considered a gross sinner, while in reality, from the Biblical idea of sin, he may be guiltless. This tithing of mint and anise and cummin may have one good effect: we know that the more sacrifices one makes for an object, the dearer the object becomes; so these unimportant regulations, meticulously carried out, undoubtedly draw one nearer to the church, if not nearer to God.

It may seem of little value to discuss the subject of sin, for it appears to be something which the church is not emphasizing much today. I am trying to remember when I last heard a sermon on sin and its consequences, but I really cannot: not for years, I should say. The last reference to such a sermon which comes to mind was one President Coolidge heard when he was in the White House. It may be that the use which the psychoanalysts have made of the feeling of guilt and the sense of sin, and the explanation they have for them has tended to weaken our belief in sin and in its dire consequences. We may be more likely to pity ourselves for having unresolved conflicts, than to blame ourselves for committing sins.

It may also be that the emphasis we have been laying on the social gospel has been bearing fruit. Jesus tried to rescue people from the social gospel of Judaism,

SIN

and to inculcate the idea of personal responsibility. The Christian church followed Jesus in this particular until lately. We cannot retain much personal responsibility in the idea of the social gospel: if I am responsible for everybody, then everybody is responsible for me. When you divide responsibility, the result is much less than the fraction of the divider. I am no longer the sinner who failed God at a critical moment, I am simply one of a group whose collective effort fell short of accomplishment, and my share of the guilt is small. The others should have done it, anyway. With the stress laid upon social sins, personal sins seem less important, and I am sure the list of them has been considerably shortened.

It has already been noted that, to some, the instincts are the root of all evil, and that temptation can be defined in terms of instinctive urges. This is the natural man which is at enmity against God. Note the protest against this point in the following poem.

There is no thing we cannot overcome.
Say not thy evil instinct is inherited,
Or that some trait inborn
Makes thy whole life forlorn,
And calls down punishment that is not merited.
Back of thy parents and grandparents lies
The Great Eternal Will! That too is thine

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Inheritance—strong, beautiful, divine,
Sure lever of success for one who tries.
There is no noble height thou canst not climb,
All triumphs may be thine in time's futurity,
If, whatsoever thy fault, thou dost not faint or halt,
But lean upon the staff of God's security.
Earth has no claim the soul cannot contest.
Know thyself part of the eternal source.
Naught can stand before thy spirit's force.
The soul's divine inheritance is best.

As a matter of fact, we realize that instincts are simply raw material, which can be manufactured into sin or sanctity, evil or good, according to the use which is made of them in relation to the whole scheme of one's life.

This identification of the instincts with sin is probably most marked in what are theologically known as the doctrines of "original sin" and "total depravity." Original sin is a natural, evil tendency common to all men, a guilt passed on to them in consequence of the evil choice of Adam, and this tendency is the source of all actual sins. The doctrine was weakening in the last century owing, perhaps, to the manifest unfairness of it, and its inconsistency with personal responsibility. However, Mendel, the monk, has restored it to us in a biological form and, thus, on a stronger and firmer basis, although considerably altered in substance. There

SIN

is no doubt now about our inheriting our original nature, sinful or otherwise, not only from our parents but from all of our ancestors, and their permanent characteristics become ours. These tendencies are given to us in what form? Why, through the instincts, of course, and if we have among our legacies such a one as original sin, the instincts must be held responsible.

Total depravity is supposed to be sinfulness which entirely permeates man from his infancy and which is due to original sin. This depravity can only be removed by regeneration through the influence of the spirit of God. Here again the instincts are responsible, as they form the motive power from the beginning of life to its close. The man who first formulated this doctrine must have been unfortunate in his friends. I do not know any people of that kind. Of course, the doctrine was not the result of induction: the facts were not gathered, analyzed, and tabulated, and a conclusion drawn from them, and then the doctrine designed; it was the other way, the doctrine was presented and then facts were sought to substantiate it.

An occasional, insane person whose fury makes him inhuman, the actions of mobs, but more especially the conduct of young children not old enough to have learned evil were the chief proof of this doctrine. This was thought to be the result of the instincts, and probably this conclusion was correct. And what were these

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

evil deeds? In children, chiefly activity or crying when parents wanted to sleep. The child has to learn more the first five years of his life than he does all the remaining years of his life combined. This keeps him busy! He is always investigating, which means upsetting flower pots, breaking dishes, destroying food, and many other activities which on account of their results, not their intents, are called bad. Actions which in an adult would be called cruelty, stealing, lying, or similar criminal or sinful deeds are simply commonplace performances to him, and have no more moral or religious significance than though he spontaneously sang hymns or offered prayers. Instincts have no moral or religious worth until we put it in them: they may then become either good or bad.

Perhaps another reason why instincts are connected with sin in many minds is that the instincts provide the motive power for sinful actions which sometimes in their intensity seem to be abnormal. This is especially true in one or two instincts which are particularly obtrusive as such. But it is also true that the instincts provide the motive power for all saintly actions, and while what we call good is likely to be more restrained than the bad, the reason for that is quite apparent.

The expression of the instincts in channels which we think of as sinful is usually along the lines of primary satisfactions, and these primary satisfactions, which are

SIN

characteristic of animal life, are more closely associated with our general idea of instincts than are the secondary satisfactions found in human experience and which mark the moral actions most strongly. This instinctive motive power, guided by the intelligence into new and less natural forms of expression, probably loses some of its intensity before the expression becomes complete in moral achievement.

We sometimes speak slightly of the imagination, as though its fruits were unimportant and not dependable. Only the imagination makes it possible for us to have morals and religion, for it is man's power to form ideals and to hold them before him which distinguishes him as a moral and religious animal. These ideals he makes so attractive to that which is highest in him that his life consists, in its distinctive qualities, in a purposive striving to realize these ideals. I think it would not be stating the case too strongly to say that the greatest factor in the accomplishment of these ideals is the power of the instincts.

Let us go a step further. Not only is man an ideal forming animal, but there seems to be some internal impulse (call it instinct, if you will) which impels him forward toward the fulfillment of the ideal, and leads him to direct all his energies toward such a culmination. We may not be distinctly aware of it, but it per-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

forms the same function mentally as the biological urge which results in evolution, or, perhaps, more correctly speaking, it is an integral part of the evolutionary process. We should not make the common error of thinking that evolution is an irresistible, upward impulse, but it is, at least, a permissive impulse, and as the ideals are usually attractive, man is hurried onward. Among other results, he is thus led into the higher realms of the moral life and into the upper reaches of religion.

We recognize, of course, that in common with all upward strivings there is a casual byway or an incidental cul-de-sac, so that an occasional retreat or turning is not unusual. But this is no more characteristic of the fantastic idealism of religion with its holy rolling, glossolalia, and reckless prophecies, than it is in the physical being with its vermiform appendices, extra toes, and superfluous hair. Nature is always experimenting, and, on the whole, in a forward direction. Man has now come to the position where his evolution may, to some extent, be self-directed, and in no realm is this more true than in morals and religion.

Our conception of sin clings to this subject of ideals, and this is nothing new, although it may be stated in modern language. We used to say that sin was rebellion against God and a refusal to accept God's plan as our life's aim. The particular sins were but fractions

of the whole. While sinfulness was breaking the laws of God, criminality consisted in breaking the laws of men, and morals maintained an intermediary position. Some of the old preachers used to condemn a moral life in contrast to a religious life because the former was man made, while the latter emanated from God. But the religious life was always the result of ideals, either our own or those of others which we adopted. The religious life meant, then, a unified life in which all the factors were in harmony with the highest ideals which we might have, and some would add, or which it was possible for us to have. Sin, then, would be defined as a failure to direct our instinctive and other impulses into channels which would increase and accentuate the fulfillment of our highest ideals and thus produce an integrated life on a lofty plane.

It is of more than passing interest to note that such books as James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*, and my own *Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, all published during the first decade of this century and all pioneer books in psychology of religion, emphasized the fact of the divided self in a pre-conversion state. One of the chief elements in the definition of conversion was the unity achieved. Sometimes the unity was spoken of as union with God, but psychologically it was recognized as a united self in contrast to the divided self.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Two quotations might not be out of place.

To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior, and unhappy becomes unified and consciously right, superior, and happy in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.—James

The idea of unity, so prominent with some, has this advantage: it comprehends the whole man; but complete unity seems to be rather the ideal, ripened experience than the common experience of converts.—Cutten

Religion then used a word which has now been made common by the psychoanalysts, and that is the word, "conflict." The divided self was the cause of this; and preachers frequently dramatized it as a battle between God and the devil for the soul of man, or talked of the conflict between the spirit of good and the spirit of evil, importuning man to throw his influence on the side of good and give God the victory. We recognize that this is not very different from the conflict, staged by the psychoanalysts between the unconscious impulses and the ego ideal, and only as the unconscious impulses are directed into channels harmonious with the finer ideals of reason can there be

SIN

an integrated life and a healthy mental condition. Sin, of course, is the negative of this procedure.

The old preachers referred to self-surrender as the process, and again all we need is an articulation of terms to express what the psychoanalyst is saying. The preachers would say, the surrender of the unregenerate self to God, the analyst would demand the subjugation of the unconscious into the higher rational ideal, the lower unconscious surrendering to the higher conscious or reality principle. In both cases the demand is made that the energy of the lower elements should be directed by the higher, in religion by consecration, in psychology by sublimation and integration.

But does the unconscious surrender? maybe so.

The result in both cases is the same: a new and enlarged ego. New powers are recognized—new to consciousness, at least. These may not be new so far as the personality is concerned, but one recognizes unconscious elements which for the first time have come into the knowledge and into the service of consciousness. With these, there is not infrequently found an emotional element of a pleasing nature which is variously designated as happiness, peace, contentment or, perhaps, some less restrained expression of joy.

Sin balks at all this, and insists upon the refusal to sublimate the instinctive impulse and to give up the primary satisfactions of the instincts. It is true that

True? unconscious

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Sin comes from the Latin word for to go wrong.
there may be a sort of negative integration possible in which sin has the upper hand. This is when the life ideals are so lowered as to have them conform to the instinctive impulses—this gives harmony, but on such a low plane that it drops from the level of religious expression on the one hand, or of healthy mindedness on the other. I suppose this is what is meant by the sin against the Holy Ghost—attributing the works of God to the devil. When one's moral and religious judgment is so impaired that he is unable to distinguish between good and bad, then there is no basis for hope, he has got himself into an irremediable condition, he has committed the unpardonable sin.

Now the ideals necessary for the highest life of mankind take one above the plane of the common, everyday humdrums. The Christian would say that they are thus revealed in and through the life and words of Jesus. Sin, then, would be the failure to reach this high standard through the direction of instinctive energies toward this ideal. Of course, the height and form of the ideals will vary with the individual, but the fulfillment brings us back to our original definition of religion as the ideational satisfaction of instinctive impulses. How these shall be satisfied ideationally is also an individual problem, but, at any rate, this will be a higher realization than the moral code of society, reaching above the herd standard.

SIN

The New Testament word for sin means "missing the mark." This co-ordinates well with our definition and exposition here. We have laid emphasis upon sin as a negative function, as a failure to achieve, as a neglect of opportunity. With the lofty ambitions, rich fields of service, and united and happy life in prospect, one neglects the chance to direct the energies of the unconscious, or the impulses inserted into the conscious, into channels which would culminate in the satisfactions of integration and achievement. The primary satisfactions of the instinctive life are preferred and chosen rather than the secondary satisfactions of the ideal life. The purpose of life has miscarried.

But the choosing of satisfactions brings us right back to hedonism. The moralists, when talking of hedonism, are apt to refer in their condemnations to the pleasures of primary instinctive satisfactions or pleasures of the appetite; but there are also satisfactions in fulfilling the ideals, not so intensive as the lower ones, but of a superior quality. Our condemnation or approval of hedonism must depend not upon the reach for pleasure in itself, but upon the pleasures for which we reach. Jesus, "for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising shame, and hath sat down at the right hand of the throne of God." When we sacrifice the lower pleasures for the higher ones we have started upstairs.

Righteousness consists in being honest—in being

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

honest with ourselves. We recognize the instinctive satisfactions for what they are, pleasures of a certain character which add to life in a certain way. We also recognize the ideals for what they are in the way of pleasures, and the enrichment of life which this satisfaction brings. We are honest enough to admit values, especially the values which are more permanent and enduring. Choosing the values most worth while, we direct the instinctive impulses into these channels; isn't that what Jesus asked of us?

In all our treatment of sin, we have made it a very subjective affair, and so it is. No one outside of our own consciousness can decide the quality of any act. Some men, who admitted the act, have died convicted of sin by their fellows, but gave it a righteous or, at least, a negative stamp, because of its relation to their whole scheme of life. Notwithstanding our recognition of this fact, there are objective standards which seem to us so certain that we judge men by them. They are standards erected by the community, by human relations as a whole, tested by the generally accepted moral or religious ideals, so that people who commit certain acts know in advance of their fellows' condemnation, and the community cannot possibly see how in the acts the lower nature could be subservient to the higher, but judge that the contrary is the case. Nevertheless, I suppose, the self must be the final arbiter.

Chapter VI

MODERN THEOLOGY

IN CONTRAST to the appeals to the instincts which have been common in religion down through the ages, we have recently been experimenting with appeals to the intelligence—and not very successfully. Many of us can well remember with what great satisfaction and abounding optimism we welcomed the New Theology. Here was something logic-proof and entirely reasonable. No longer would men scoff at religion or laugh at its vagaries. We had finished forever with what we called emotionalism in religion and got down to a rock foundation. Very good! But what have been the results? Some people think that there is nothing colder than a dog's nose, but what about the New Theology? The truth is that the New Theology is dying on its feet because it is so purely rationalistic. It is too successful: it is a case of a cat drowning in cream. What we thought of as emotionalism, of which we were so shy, was really an appeal to the instincts, and frequently a very crude one. It carried emotion with it.

The well-prepared minister of today is both by inclination and by training a rationalist. He has spent

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

four years in high school, four years in college, and at least three years in a theological seminary. During these eleven years of training the unpardonable sin was a flaw in his logic, and there was no way in which he could lose caste among his fellows so easily as by descending to the use of any means for stirring the emotions. He must win his audience by an appeal to their intelligence.

Nothing can show better the effect of intellectual analysis on religion than the difficulty of maintaining a devotional or spiritual emphasis in a divinity school. Notwithstanding all one can do, the student becomes intellectually critical of his own as well as of the devotional efforts of others. In fact, it seems natural for the devotional element to be eliminated, and for the training to be more and more intellectual. This is not anyone's desire, far less anyone's fault, but rather the natural result of the necessary training. Efforts are made to correct this condition in the lives of the students, but it is not easy. When the instincts are eliminated and the intellect alone is asked to function the result seems to be inevitable.

The pew, too, in recent years has had training in the schools and colleges, and has been schooled in the opinion that reasoning is the sole basis for appeals of any sort among human beings. They are flattered by the attitude of the minister, and after the sermon

MODERN THEOLOGY

approvingly nod their heads in agreement—and do nothing. There is an intellectual assent but no motive force.

Practically all Protestants claim a converted, or, at least, a distinctive membership, but the demand for this has been growing gradually less, until now an old-fashioned conversion is considered a novel experience, the propriety of which is questionable. Instead of the subjective experience there is being substituted an outward rite or an ecclesiastic observance. Any substitute of objectivity for subjectivity makes religion correspondingly cheaper for the individual. Worship programs have taken the place of devotional meetings, religious emphasis week has displaced the revival meeting, and social betterment plans are substituted for celestial ambitions. These may be intellectually defensible but they are instinctively dull and unprofitable.

The unlettered minister on the rural hillside has no such inhibitions. He is not concerned with logic, and reason seems to obfuscate his style. His appeals to the instincts may be crude, but they are effective and permeated with motive power. He cares little about whether his auditors give intellectual assent so long as they are stirred to action, and although he knows nothing about formal psychology he easily recognizes that appeals to the instincts do the work, and these he uses.

Far be it from me to ask anyone to give up his intel-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

lectual satisfactions in religion and to return to the unreasoned assertions of the religious fanatics of former days, which have caused the portion of New York State, near where I live, to be dubbed with the unenviable epithet of "The Burnt District." The reason that these spiritual fires swept over this part of the state, carrying everything before them, was that the torch was applied by preachers who used appeals to the instincts. I have one point to make and one only and it is this: intellectual satisfactions can live in perfect harmony with appeals to the instincts. The one is a matter of theological reliance, the other a method of religious extension. Not having wit enough to distinguish belief from method, when we threw the former doctrine overboard we jettisoned the method also. Equally stupid was the idea that because we became rationalistic in theology we must appeal only to the intellect; and that religion could not minister to the whole man, but only to some kind of mutilated half.

If, as has been suggested, religion is the ideational satisfaction of the instincts, it is only natural that its results should be achieved through appeals to the instincts. The history of religion shows this to be true. Some of these appeals have been far more refined than others, and the successful ones have all had the same basis. The theme of salvation presented by Jesus is notably instinctive in its appeal, and John the Baptist

MODERN THEOLOGY

even uses modern psychological terms when he calls upon people to flee from the wrath to come.

Rationalism is in no sense a religious novelty. The rationalism of the eighteenth century was contrasted with supernaturalism as the source of authority in religion. The term today is one somewhat of disdain, and is used by those who accept the literal interpretation of the Bible as authority, and directed against those who demand that reason must supercede literalism in Biblical interpretation, the authority in religion being the reaction of the human mind to truth. The matter with which we are principally concerned may be rescued from the lists of theological encounter, for it concerns itself, in the main, with religious technique rather than with theological theory, and may be applicable to any variety of theological presentation. The appeal to the instincts is more likely to be used today by the literalists, but there is no reason why the most rationalistic proposition cannot be presented with an appeal to the instincts. I remember a minister telling me that the previous Sunday evening he had preached on apostolic succession and at the close of the service seven arose for prayers.

Jonathan Edwards had no trouble with his appeal to the instincts—principally that of self-preservation. He preached on such subjects as, “Sinners in the hands of an angry God,” until people so vividly felt themselves

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

slipping into hell that they grasped the seat in front to prevent further downward motion, and, in fear, called aloud for salvation. He vividly described the fate of unsaved children and talked of infants gnashing their toothless gums in hell, until parents wept for the fate of their offspring.

Now intelligence steps in and rejects this appeal. We cannot conceive of its being presented in language sufficiently lurid to move educated people today. Should not intelligence reject every appeal to flight with its accompanying emotion of fear? Has not religion been criticized most severely for being founded on or furthered through the centuries by fear? Have we not been emancipated from that? No, not yet! It is not only perfectly legitimate but most reasonable to take council of our fears and to flee in time. Is it unreasonable to fear drinking automobile drivers? Is it unreasonable to fear typhoid-infected milk or excessive burdens of debt or conscienceless criminals? Are there not some things which religion has to present which we should fear? Is perdition eliminated? Can we, as was said of Lord Westbury, abolish the eternity of punishment and dismiss hell with costs?

Well, it is probable that Jonathan Edwards' hell has been assigned to the discard, but new ages bring with them new hells, and these should be preached by ministers and feared by parishioners. As astronomy, so

MODERN THEOLOGY

much distrusted and castigated in Galileo's time, is returning a God to us and demanding a God for itself, so biology the *bête noire* of the theologian in the last century is returning hell to us. Read if you will E. Ray Lankester's *Degeneration*, or chapters on Degeneration, Death, and Parasitism in Henry Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*—both old books now and somewhat obsolete—if you want to see what kind of a hell biology pictures for us. See the living death of the Sacculina, and decide whether the traditional hell does not seem like a Sunday-school picnic compared with what biology promises to the wastrel.

The nineteenth century was the biologists' century, in which evolution reigned supreme. And what was evolution? A theory of the way life had traveled to reach its highest development? Perhaps so, theoretically. Practically, in the minds of many, it was an irresistible force pushing us upward whether we wished to go or not. No wonder hell was abolished—how could it stand against an irresistible force? No wonder fear in religion was condemned and driven out of the temple.

In the twentieth century the biologist still functions and has given us a new word—and a sinister one; that word is "degeneration." It is just as real, just as important, and just as arresting a word as evolution. If we have climbed out of the abyss, the chasm is still

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

open and the edge is slippery. Under these circumstances should flight and fear be eliminated from religion? Whenever, because it is easier, we choose a lower order instead of a higher, when both are open to us, we have started downstairs. That is the danger and that is properly to be feared.

Is not that what Jesus pictured? What is the real tragedy in his story of the Prodigal Son and where the real joy? It was disconcerting that the boy should ask for his inheritance and leave home to dissipate it; it was too bad that he should go and waste his money in disreputable company; it was an inevitable consequence but distressing that he should be in want, but these things were simply history repeated in every village, time out of mind, and, if that were all there was of the story, it was not worth the telling. But there is more: he came to himself and deliberately made a decision. And what was the decision? I will arise and go to my father and say to him, "Father, I am no more worthy to be thy son, make me as one of thy hired servants." That was the tragedy! The son of the house stepped down and chose a lower order—he deliberately tried to become something less because it was easy. But the joy of the story is that the father refused to permit him to do so—he ran to meet him, ordered a new robe, a ring for his finger, and a feast of the best, treating him as a son and demanding that he act as a son. That

MODERN THEOLOGY

is salvation! Well, here we have damnation and salvation according to biological theology! Perfectly logical, scientific, and reasonable, and yet with the flight instinct and fear emotion prominent on the one hand, and the instinct of self-preservation and acquisition appealed to on the other.

Jesus' method of teaching by parables was very effective and very appealing. Each one touched an instinct, and each one suggested a picture which a person was at liberty to paint to suit himself. In the parable of the lost coin, for example, the reader or hearer of Jesus' day would picture the mud or stone floor of the house with the woman vigorously using a broom made of branches; today, of course, one would picture the floor covered with rugs, and a corn broom or a vacuum cleaner. None of His parables was sufficiently detailed to interfere with one's personal interpretations, yet the point of appeal was so simple and direct that no one missed it.

The New Theology with its appeal to the intelligence, and intelligence only, has entirely annihilated the dramatic. The Bible is dramatic from cover to cover: from the garden of Eden to the Apocalypse of John the Divine. Eastern imagery demanded that, but what is there dramatic about a syllogism? Extract the dramatic from the scene of the last judgment, the temptation of Jesus, or Jesus' walking on the water,

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

and reduce these to an intellectual residuum; what have you left that can appeal? We must remember that the primitive appeals to the instincts were not syllogistic or algebraic abstractions worked out to a clever solution. They were scenes in the forest appealing to the pictorial. Fear was inspired by the sight of a wild animal in the distance, not by the proof that it was possible for an animal to do harm; desire was stimulated by the sight of attractive food, not by a chemical discussion concerning proteins, carbohydrates, and fats. When the imagination was developed it dealt with pictures not with propositions.

Reading has not yet taken the place of pictures—whether actual scenes or representations. That is the reason that magazines and tabloids with little reading and much pictorial material appeal so strongly to the mass of the people. Even the most erudite look at the pictures first. With religion depending so much upon the instincts, can we expect results when we eliminate the dramatic? Can we afford to cast out the cradle of Bethlehem, the cross of Calvary, or the boy Jesus in the temple talking to the lawyers? The skill with which the Roman Catholic Church has dramatized every component part of its organization is surely one secret of its tenacity, and the way in which symbols are encouraged, to be interpreted according to the intelligence of

MODERN THEOLOGY

the worshiper, shows understanding and cleverness, if not consistency.

This tendency to eliminate the dramatic in favor of the purely intellectual is not entirely confined to religion; we can see it plainly in connection with other vital matters. Take, for example, the development (one might say, overdevelopment) of patriotism in this country. Whether or not it was founded on a mythology, we had it just the same. Every dramatic incident which could be cited concerning our history or biography was paraded on every opportunity. We appealed to imitation, emulation, aspiration, pride, hatred, righteousness—every available human response—and it succeeded—perhaps oversucceeded—as we developed a conspicuous chauvinism.

But what now? We must not be silly, and, above all things, not oversentimental. Let us forget Washington's cherry tree, and search his writings for some logical concept dealing with the theory of government; let us cease mentioning Lincoln's pine-knot lighted study, and remember his words concerning the Missouri Compromise; let us no longer picture Nathan Hale standing pinioned and regretting that he had only one life to give for his country; let us erase from our memories James Wolfe and Admiral Perry and Paul Revere and other picturesque patriots. With what result? A patriot is no longer one who can sacrifice for

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

his country, but one who succeeds in forcing his country to sacrifice for him. In contrast look at the totalitarian countries! One may not agree with their objectives, but there is no doubt about the success of their methods with their own people. No opportunity for dramatizing a situation is lost; every instinct is bombarded with appeals, glamour covers every incident as with a halo. If one analyzes these appeals, or these policies critically, there is little to appeal to any intelligence, but it succeeds—it succeeds!

Or let us take as another example the recent propaganda against war. War is the most idiotic thing in the world, for when it is finished we probably have the problem with which we started still unsolved, and dozens of other more serious ones as well. The abolition of war does not require an appeal to the intellect for thinking people and is valueless to the unthinking, yet that is the form of appeal with which we have been deluged, with the result that we are rushing into war as fast as we can go. When we finally find ourselves at war, we shall discover that we have been led into it, not by an appeal to the intellect but by one to the instincts, probably that of self-defense. We are all sure that we shall never again go into war, but when the flags begin to fly and the drums start to roll we shall fall in with the rest, unable to resist the pressure of the instincts, notwithstanding the veto of the intelligence.

MODERN THEOLOGY

Of course, it is different in politics. An appeal to the electorate is never overloaded with intelligence. Cast in review the last three federal elections in this country. In none of them was there an appeal to the intellect, at least, on the winning side. The results might have been the same if there had been, but that is not the question under consideration. In the case of the first two, the appeal was to flight—with the accompanying emotion of fear. In 1928, we were asked to flee from Smith and in 1932 from Hoover. It did not matter much where we went so long as we fled from the respective ogres, and like a flock of frightened sheep bounding over a precipice, we stampeded. In 1936, the appeal was to the instinct of acquisitiveness. Fear had been eliminated by the generous outpouring of other peoples' money by the open-handed and free-hearted people in control in Washington. Then they promised more after having proved their ability to produce and their willingness to bribe. The other party, also lacking moral fiber, had no more originality and initiation than to follow afar off in the same direction. History will probably look on this election as the most barefaced bribery ever attempted by both parties to seduce a moronic electorate. The acquisitive instinct was certainly disrobed!

While the regular denominations have gone considerably beyond the flirting stage with the intellectualism of the New Theology, certain small and newer sects

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

have recognized the values in the religious appeals of the past and have capitalized on them. Not infrequently church buildings belonging to regular denominations have been sold to some irregular group. Probably the neighborhood had changed and poorer people had moved in, so that the church lost its former congregation, and could not appeal to the people in its vicinity. It then moved up town.

This new group becomes the refuge of the poor, the disinherited, and the instinctively starved. It preaches celestial satisfactions instead of mundane riches, it prophesies destruction to the rich and the powerful and the exaltation of the poor, it holds tenaciously to the revival technique, it bans things as unholy which the parishioners cannot afford, and turns the minds of its members from worldly wants to heavenly glories. These tenets are gradually modified as the group succeeds, and may be entirely eliminated as the group becomes prosperous. In fact, conformity is usually the fruit of prosperity.

It has already been suggested that biological degeneration may be substituted for the orthodox hell as a stimulus to the instinct of flight. But every other appeal to the instincts may be similarly modernized. Take, if you will, the acquisitive instinct—a powerful one. Of course, the original acquisitive instinct could not have had money as its object, for there was not any. It did

MODERN THEOLOGY

crave wealth. This instinct always craves wealth, but the composition of wealth changes from age to age. It might be hunting grounds, weapons, slaves, women, gold or goods; it might be stocks or bonds or houses or clothing or jewelry; it was anything of which others had more than we, which people generally recognize as desirable and which for some reason we want. But the things which people want are not all material; spiritual qualities may be very highly regarded. Education, kindness, generosity, gentleness, friendliness, optimism, all are recognized as desirable possessions; can we not turn the instinct of acquisitiveness toward them, as wealth of a more lasting and valuable character than silver or gold? "But desire earnestly the greater gifts," advised the apostle.

There intrudes itself, in a very tenacious way, the question of whether, after all, secondary satisfactions may be real satisfactions in a less cultured and mentally weaker group. The satisfactions, to be sure, must be ideational, and to be found in wishes and hopes and assurances of fulfilled promises, but can we substitute kindness and generosity and optimism and other character products, for golden streets, and pearly gates and mansions and harp playing and eternal rest as end products? These character products can be obtained, perhaps, as payment for, or as a condition of securing the crasser material objects; but the prospect of obtain-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

ing longed-for objects, which have always been beyond the furthest reach, is the supreme motive, and one wonders how far certain groups should be denied. Have they wished to be good as much as they've wished to be rich or comfortable? In this connection there is suggested Eugene Ware's "Song of the Washerwoman."

In a very humble cot,
In a rather quiet spot,
 In the suds and in the soap,
 Worked a woman full of hope;
Working, singing, all alone,
In a sort of undertone,
 "With a Saviour for a friend,
 He will keep me to the end."

Sometimes happening along,
I had heard the semi-song,
 And I often used to smile,
 More in sympathy than guile;
But I never said a word
In regard to what I heard,
 As she sang about her friend
 Who would keep her to the end.

Not in sorrow nor in glee
Working all day long was she,
 As her children, three or four,

MODERN THEOLOGY

Played around her on the floor;
But in monotones the song
She was humming all day long,
"With the Saviour for a friend,
He will keep me to the end."

It's a song I do not sing,
For I scarce believe a thing
Of the stories that are told
Of the miracles of old;
But I know that her belief
Is the anodyne of grief,
And will always be a friend
That will keep her to the end.

Just a trifle lonesome she,
Just as poor as poor could be,
But her spirits always rose,
Like the bubbles in the clothes,
And though widowed and alone,
Cheered her with the monotone,
Of a Saviour and a friend
Who would keep her to the end.

I have seen her rub and scrub,
On the washboard in the tub,
While the baby, sopped in suds,
Rolled and tumbled in the duds;
Or was paddling in the pools,

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

With old scissors stuck in spools;
She still humming of her friend
Who would keep her to the end.

Human hopes and human creeds
Have their root in human needs;
And I would not wish to strip
From that washerwoman's lip
Any song that she can sing,
Any hope that song can bring;
For the woman has a friend
Who will keep her to the end.

Yes, human hopes and human creeds have their root in human needs, and the needs we have been emphasizing have been the instinctive ones. The need of this woman for friendship and security with their idealized satisfaction was the keynote of her religion. Ware was right, we should not rob her of it. If instead of friendship, the need and hope had been centered in golden streets or mansions or harps, should we rob her of the idealized satisfaction of those? "Virtue is its own reward" is poor pay for most of us, and it is difficult for many to realize that our rewards are in the same coin in which we make our payments; that character efforts have their returns in character refinements and not necessarily in riches or power or position. If these come, they are accidental.

MODERN THEOLOGY

If we insist upon the rarified forms of ideational satisfactions are we not robbing many people of all the religion which they are capable of enjoying or experiencing? When men grow bigger than their crudities they throw them away; in the meantime, should we not be willing that they should enjoy and, if possible, profit by them? We may be sure they are wrong, but not any surer than they are that they are right. I remember hearing an address by an influential minister at one time in which he proved, certainly to his own entire satisfaction, that the Holy Spirit was a person by quoting scripture to show what he did and that therefore he had arms and legs and feet. Being a young man, and somewhat inexperienced, I foolishly tried to show him that the elements of personality did not consist in bodily members, and that it was no more necessary to think of the personality of the Holy Spirit as depending upon a body than it was concerning God. To this he countered, "What! God does not have a body? Does not the Bible speak of His strong right arm?" I found him much surer of his position than I was of mine.

Many young people have been robbed of their crude ideations, without accepting the higher interpretations as substitutes, and have become irreligious as a consequence. Many parents with the unrefined concepts of former days have mourned because their children, with

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

the benefits of education and culture, have repudiated the uninterpreted imagery of the Bible, and consequently have lost their religion. The truth is, of course, that religion is far more individualistic than has been admitted; each one's, in reality, is unique. One of the greatest values of James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* was to emphasize the fact that there were varieties of religious experience. While our instincts, in the large, may be alike, the means of obtaining secondary satisfactions, or of idealizing the satisfactions must vary according to the personal equation and experience of each individual.

There are certain preachers and certain denominations which have been very successful in stimulating the pugnacious instinct. A denomination must have a strong central organization to do this well, and the preacher must be autocratic to be most successful. The blame for starting the trouble must always be imputed to some one else. Some one has insulted God, or defamed the church, or slandered the clergy, or spread heresy, and the church in self-defense must attack. A crusade is suggested or planned and every true believer is enlisted in the battle.

If a denomination claims to be the only channel through which the revelation of truth can flow, there is no difficulty in finding a justification for pugnacious action, for heretics are always available. The same may

MODERN THEOLOGY

be said of any particular philosophy or revelation, or any standard for judging truth. The defender of the faith is usually near. This instinct is easily aroused, as warriors of all kinds well know, and the church has been peculiarly fortunate or unfortunate in always finding a champion.

Apart from the sadistic outlets provided by inquisitions and persecutions, the outstanding examples of mass pugnacious expression, for which the Christian church has been responsible, are probably the Crusades. They cannot be called religious, but rather the misdirected results of a religious appeal, and viewed from the eminence of the twentieth century they seem too fantastic and bizarre to be credited as historical facts. The estimates of the loss of life vary from two to seven millions, the weight of authority favoring the larger number. Most of the victims were members of unarmed and untrained mobs, without supplies, transport, or leadership. The crowning inanity and insanity were shown in the Childrens' Crusade in which over 70,000 children participated, many of whom paid for their fanaticism with their lives.

Perhaps it is scarcely fair to lay all this upon the doorstep of the pugnacious instinct, but this was certainly an important factor. Appeals to the spirit of adventure, to the hope or certainty of worldly gain, crowned by the assurance of spiritual salvation, were

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

also added to the duty of slaying the infidel Turks, and these undoubtedly helped to augment the psychic epidemic. The weight of the church, even at this time when rival popes were struggling for the chair of St. Peter, was felt on every hand, and those who participated believed they were performing a religious duty, and helping a holy cause. This condition is usually sought in every war by both belligerents, for in the past this factor has been necessary to inspire the requisite sacrifice.

Notwithstanding the peace-loving pretensions of the Christian church, the pugnacious instinct is a human factor and an important one. It should be used and an object should be found for its satisfaction; at least, we can fight for peace! As long as human nature is what it is, and society presents so many difficult problems, pugnacity will never lack moral and religious aims for which to break a lance.

One of our strongest instincts is that of self-assertion, with its accompanying emotion of pride. Of course, the proud did not rate particularly high in the Hebrew and early Christian days, but the enormity of the sin depended upon the object of the pride. The psalmist refers frequently in a scornful way to the proud: "Him that hath a high look and a proud heart will I not suffer." The writer of Proverbs says, "Pride and arrogancy, and the evil way, and the froward mouth do I

MODERN THEOLOGY

hate," and in James we find, "The scripture saith, God resisteth the proud but giveth grace to the humble." But does not the sin depend upon the cause of one's pride? These passages evidently refer to those who are proud of power or riches or position. Could we not translate certain other passages so as to refer to pride in a favorable way, as, e.g., "Rejoice in the Lord always, and again I say rejoice," or in the use of the negative in such passages as, "Yet I am not ashamed: for I know him whom I have believed," and, "I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ"?

In recent days, the appeal to pride in religion has waned considerably, because distinctive beliefs have been discouraged and the difficulties of the Christian life have been blotted out. At one time it was preached that, "narrow is the gate, and straightened the way, that leadeth into life, and few be they that find it." Not so now: but broad is the gate and any old way suffices. We must now be broad-minded and liberal, so that the Christian life is not distinctive, and church membership is immaterial. It does not make any difference what one believes, and a person with positive beliefs is to be shunned like David Harum's "seven-day Baptists," "so narrer in their views that fourteen on 'em c'n sit, side by side, in a buggy."

It is no secret that the secrets of secret societies and fraternities have no intrinsic value or they could not

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

remain secret. You would not think much of the man who would keep the secrets of the Masons or the Odd-fellows away from his wife if they were of any importance and of any worth to her. Yet as valueless as they are, they give the member a certain feeling of distinction, because he knows something he won't tell. They set him off from his fellows. The same was formerly true in connection with certain denominations: they had beliefs and practices which were distinctive, and the believers were different and so prided themselves. Such ordinances as baptism by immersion and close communion of the Baptists of former days, and the ceremonies of the Episcopal and Catholic and other liturgical churches were important, not in themselves but largely to differentiate the members from others and to satisfy their instinct of self-assertion.

Even those churches, which withdrew fellowship from their members for dancing and card playing or attending theaters, had some psychological justification, if not moral warrant. My father was turned out of the church for dancing, but he continued to attend the church services and to dance. However, that church asserted itself, and I have no doubt but that the members felt a justifiable pride in the fact that they had done a difficult and disagreeable task because they considered it a duty. As foolish as that seems to us today, I wonder if it did not have some advantage over the

MODERN THEOLOGY

namby-pamby, milk and water, lukewarm attitude of the modern church. Church discipline is a lost art. What the church of today has gained in breadth it has lost in depth.

But there is no need of discarding this instinct: it can still be used in these modern days. There are distinctive values in religion, and its fruits may be the basis for self-assertion and for pride. Pride is a personal matter: it is difficult to become very proud concerning results spread over a large territory. Civic pride is considerably attenuated. Perhaps the social gospel, so much the present vogue, accounts for the lack of self-assertion. Jesus came to save us from the results of a social gospel: the Hebrew religion was a social religion: God's dealings were not with individuals but with Israel. Jesus emphasized the individual responsibility and the individual salvation—not a small part of His contribution to religion. Perhaps it is time for a prophet of individualism in religion to reappear; we certainly need some of that emphasis.

To use this instinct in religion, personal victories and achievements should be stressed, personal distinctions should be indicated, and personal opportunities should be made significant. Pride comes from activity not receptivity. A sermon absorber has not much to be proud of, but a church worker has. A pastor who finds tasks for his parishioners to perform is far wiser and of more

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

value than the one who works himself into a decline. We are proud of our own beliefs, our own activity, our own accomplishments, and even our own humility; and we should be.

Coupled with the instincts of self-assertion and of acquisition is that of competition. Perhaps we should say that competition is a resultant of these two instincts, at any rate, it is a natural reaction. Some good souls are endeavoring to remove competition in religion, under the impression that they are performing a praiseworthy service. Not so! The law of progress in any field is a combination of competition and of co-operation, but each in its own proper place. Unrestricted competition within the group is the rule, but there should be co-operation of the members of this group to compete with another group.

The law of progress is not different in religion from that in other phases of life. Some of the arguments and debates of former years may seem a waste of good time and good paper, but they were serious matters then. At any rate, the good people of that day had interest enough in the church and in their beliefs to argue about them, a condition which seems to have lapsed. Everything is so peaceful and harmonious and insipid now that one cannot start a fight on any religious theme.

I know that we say that the energy formerly devoted

MODERN THEOLOGY

to competition should be used in co-operation and much more will be accomplished, but we need the competitive spirit to engender the energy, and without competition there is no energy available for co-operation. Lack of competition does not necessarily mean co-operation, it may mean indolence and inertia.

Co-operation rarely adds up to the sum of the competing units. The strength of union is seen only where the competing parts unite to compete with another combination. The element of competition must be injected somewhere to produce the maximum power. There is no reason why the spirit of competition should not be used to the full in today's religious work: one can compete in good deeds as well as in evil ones, for virtues as well as for dollars, for spiritual power as well as for political power. A single, union church in a community may be at a disadvantage, it lacks the stimulus of competition. At any rate, competition is an element which should be recaptured by Protestantism.

There is one more instinct which may be mentioned, by way of illustration, for modern use, and that is the instinct of self-abasement, or sacrifice, or altruism. In the Christian religion this is a standard virtue. Few persons realize how strong this instinct is in the tree-run individual. It is an instinct in its own right, and is supplemented by the parental, the filial, and the gregarious instincts. It shows itself pre-eminently at times of

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

1082
crisis and calamity, but it is always near the surface, balancing the acquisitive instinct and other forms of selfishness. Its lasting power may be somewhat limited, but its initial expression is strong, and it can be continued by frequent stimulation. Theologians are wont to speak of selfishness as a natural product, and sacrifice as a fruit of grace, but the one is as much an instinct as the other.

There have been notable examples of the success of appeals of this kind, sometimes when selfish appeals have failed. One's mind turns to Garibaldi's address to his soldiers: "Soldiers, what I have to offer you is fatigue, danger, struggle, and death: the chill of the cold night in the free air, and heat under the burning sun; no lodgings, no munitions, no provisions, but forced marches, dangerous watchposts and continual struggle with bayonets against batteries—those who love freedom and their country may follow me." Did they slink away when they heard these words? Not they! They rushed to his standard. And what appeal did Jesus make to His disciples? "Whosoever he be of you that renounceth not all he hath, he cannot be my disciple." Or, again, "They shall lay their hands on you, and shall persecute you, delivering you up to the synagogues and prisons, bringing you before kings and governors for my name's sake." What was the result? They left all and followed Him.

MODERN THEOLOGY

The Christian church has always made successful appeals along this line; from the time of the early martyrs to the present moment men have rushed to surrender riches, position, time, and even life. One of the weaknesses of the modern church is that it demands too little and never enough of its followers. The law of love is, that we love those for whom we do most, not those who do most for us—a call to sacrifice would increase our interest in the church and might give it a following which would save the world. A big and worth-while task is always more attractive than a picayune and insignificant request. One reason why men are not more interested in the church is that they are usually asked to do women's or children's work. A man's job always appeals to a man: the harder the better; it is a challenge! Don't ask a man to sell tickets for a church concert; ask him to plan next year's work, or to make arrangements for securing a new church building.

It is to be hoped that these illustrations may indicate in a small way the compatability of intellectual satisfactions with appeals to the instincts in modern church work. These appeals to the instincts must be restored or the church will cease to function.

Chapter VII

HYMNOLOGY

It is a truism to mention that music was used in worship long before there was a Christian church. Chants and crude songs were found in the worship of the most primitive people, and musical instruments were used to intensify and to emphasize the rhythm. Elisha requested the minstrel to play in order that he might prophesy, and when the minstrel played "the hand of the Lord came upon him."

In the Christian church at the outset the music consisted mostly of the singing of psalms. In the third century, or earlier, the anthem of the angels (Luke 2:14) was expanded from the Greek original into the Latin hymn, the Gloria in Excelsis of later date. About the twelfth or thirteenth century the hymnology of the Roman church had a singularly solemn and majestic tone, and was inseparably wedded to the music. Its cadence was musical rather than metrical, and to be appreciated it must be heard and not read.

There was a noticeable contrast in Protestant hymnology, which flourished at the time of the Reformation. Protestant religion, with its free and joyous spirit, in-

HYMNOLOGY

spired by the doctrine of gratuitous forgiveness, was evidenced by the outburst of music and poetry, especially in Germany. Luther himself published thirty-six hymns, twenty-one of which were original, and music made a corresponding advance. His hymn, "A Mighty Fortress is Our God," has been called by Heine "the Marseillaise of the Reformation."

The place of singing in religious revivals, camp meetings, and other similar gatherings, where action was desired and expected, has always been an important one. Different leaders naturally varied in their methods of use and in their emphasis. An outstanding example of the use of singing was in the Welsh Revival of 1904-06. There, singing crowded out preaching and rivaled prayer as a factor in the meetings; it was known as a "singing revival." The Welsh are naturally very musical and especially are they noted singers, so the use of song would be along the line of habitual expression. When an attempt was made at that time to extend this revival over the world, by use of methods found valuable in Wales, it proved to be abortive. Other peoples lacked the background.

The nominal leader of the revival was Evan Roberts, a young, inexperienced preacher. If his addresses could be dignified by the name of sermons, they would be described as short, commonplace, and unemotional. The singing was the conspicuous and moving feature.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Bodies of people on the way to meetings or returning from meetings would burst into song, and the principal streets of villages and towns were often filled with singing pedestrians. During the meetings, prayers, sermons, exhortations, and announcements were interrupted by singing, and a powerful singing voice could often control the whole meeting.

In addition to the time-honored and tested hymns of the church which always assume their place in revival services, each revival is likely to bring forth some one or more hymns which are the product of the revival. This may vary in different towns or cities. The so-called "Glory Song" was the outstanding hymn of the Welsh Revival, and, even today, recalls the experiences of that time.

In the Moody and Sankey fellowship, Mr. Moody always gave generous praise to Mr. Sankey's contribution, and certainly it was great. Probably never in an equal period of time, with the possible exception of that of the Wesley Revival, did the church produce so many new hymns and sacred songs as when Moody and Sankey were in their period of power. During this time there was developed a new type of devotional songs used in prayer meetings and in Sunday schools. Not only Mr. Sankey, but a group of other musicians assisted in this, in which were P. P. Bliss, W. H. Doane, W. J. Kirkpatrick, W. B. Bradbury, and John R.

HYMNOLOGY

Sweeney. While neither so elevated in thought nor so fine in form as the hymns of the Wesleys, these gospel hymns of the Moody and Sankey period have an appeal to the young and the untrained which exceeds some of the more stately compositions used by the church. Some of these contributions were really creditable and will live; many, of course, served only a limited period and died naturally. But a Moody and Sankey meeting without music would be unthinkable, and hymns were practically always sung during the invitation period when action was desired. It will be remembered that "Billy" Sunday was hardly more in the public eye than his chorister Homer Rodeheaver and his much advertised trombone. They vied in attracting the people. The song which characterized the Sunday meetings was "Brighten the corner where you are."

On the other hand, Charles G. Finney, a century ago, was not in favor of much singing in his revival services. He considered it contrary to the spirit of agonizing prayer and of deep conviction of sin. I am not sure that this would be considered an objection today. Evidently he thought that it stimulated the sthenic emotions and the instincts of self-assertion.

Revival meetings, with their exciting methods, not infrequently produced certain abnormal, physical phenomena such as shouting, crying, trembling, jerks, convulsions, falling; and such abnormal psychical phe-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

3
nomena as glossolalia, visions, prophecy, or even unconsciousness. It is noticeable that in revivals, where singing was prominent, there was a corresponding lack of these abnormal happenings. The singing seemed to provide an outlet for pent-up emotions so that the energy did not follow in these primitive channels. The value of the singing was thus twofold: negative in preventing these abnormal phenomena, and positive in leading to desired action through the stimulation of the instincts.

In discussing the subject of hymnology we readily recognize that there are two factors which combine to appeal to the instincts, the music and the words. I wish it were possible for me to present adequately the effect of the former, for it is evident that the musical appeal is a potent one. It is not difficult to distinguish between martial music which inspires us to action with its pronounced rhythm and compelling tones, and the soft, appealing music of the sentimental. But why do they so appeal? The drums, which seem to be as lacking in music as almost any imaginable noise when played alone, have their own stirring appeal after a while, and succeed in moving us. There is something more than their centuries-long association with war!

Music, which has long been a dutiful servant of religion, has done its work well.

In many Christian churches certain words are so

HYMNOLOGY

definitely associated with certain music that the music inevitably recalls the words: the music is, in our minds, synonymous with the words. Under these circumstances there is no need of an explanation concerning the appeal of the music to the instincts. But, apart from this association, music has charms to soothe the savage breast as well as to stir the savage to glorious martial feats, and civilization, while refining the music somewhat, still responds to its cadence.

Sound is the most natural method of expressing emotions in both men and animals, and the most effective. The immediate and apparently instinctive response of very young birds and animals to the danger signal given by parents, is a sight which can not well be forgotten. We know the effect of the inflection given by an actor or a reader. I knew of a man who, having lost his legs, followed the circus during the summer, soliciting alms from the crowd, and spent the winter practicing to obtain the proper inflection and accent of "Don't pass me by, brother, don't pass me by!" Herbert Spencer's theory of music was that it is a development from the emotional outcries of our primitive ancestors. While this is not accepted today, it does show the close relationship which is recognized between music and the emotions.

The primitive appeal which music makes can arouse enthusiasms, modify bodily fatigue, stir a crowd to

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

gaiety, inspire courage and daring, and calm the excited and angry.

All the hearts of men were softened
By the pathos of his music:
For he sang of peace and freedom,
Sang of beauty, love, and longing;
Sang of death, and life undying
In the Islands of the Blessed,
In the Kingdom of Ponemah,
In the land of the Hereafter.

It is especially potent in engendering moods and in deepening moods or feelings stirred by some other stimulant. Rhythm, more than any other factor, seems to appeal to the instincts, and this is not strange: rhythm is a factor in all vital functions, from heart beats to peristaltic action. Rhythm is an element in all music from the lowest to the highest, and undoubtedly plays the most potent part in the appeal.

Music of itself might convey a message to a sensitive person, but usually alone it cannot move the average person to make any response. Most persons cannot interpret its meaning. It requires words to make it articulate. Literature also uses sound as a medium and is the only other art which can stir the recipient to immediate action, of varying degrees of intensity. The rhyme and

HYMNOLOGY

rhythm of the poetry in which the hymn is written adds to the effect of the music. It supplements the effect of the music when the hymn is sung and compensates for the lack of music when the hymn is read. These two arts of music and poetry combine to appeal to the instincts and the accompanying emotions. Apart from the form of the poetry, there are the words to be considered.

In order to see and to appreciate the appeals to the instincts in hymns, it might be well for us to choose, if we can, the hymns which have shown the most motive power. To do this, I suppose we should examine those hymns which are specially chosen for and most often used in revival services. I have already referred to the demand for security, which formerly took the form of celestial security, and many hymns administering to this instinctive requirement were often sung. Among these were "Gates Ajar," "Angel Bands," "Beulah Land," "Where sickness and death never come," "There's a land that is fairer than day," "We shall meet beyond the river," "The beautiful land on high," "Some sweet day, by and by," "Jerusalem, my happy home," "My heavenly home is bright and fair," "We'll gather then in Glory by and by," and many others. It will only be necessary to quote one of them to portray the general theme.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

There's a land that is fairer than day,
And by faith we can see it afar;
For the Father waits over the way,
To prepare us a dwelling place there.

Chorus

In the sweet by and by
We shall meet on the beautiful shore.

We shall sing on that beautiful shore
The melodious songs of the blest,
And our spirits shall sorrow no more,
Not a sigh for the blessing of rest.

To our bountiful Father above,
We will offer our tribute of praise,
For the glorious gift of his love,
And the blessings which hallow our days.

These hymns, upon the wings of which many have soared to celestial glories, are not so popular today.

There is another form of security to which hymns of a different kind point us. This is not the security of life beyond the grave but the security brought to us by our faith and trust in Jesus, and which show our assurance of salvation. Among these are "Saviour, more than life to me," "All to Christ I owe," "Only trust

HYMNOLOGY

Him," "What a Friend we have in Jesus," "Trusting Jesus that is all," "The Lily of the Valley," "In the shadow of his wings," "Oh, I am so happy in Jesus," "The Valley of Blessing," and "I've found a friend." I shall quote the last one.

I've found a Friend; oh, such a Friend!
He loved me ere I knew Him;
He drew me with the cords of love,
And thus he bound me to Him.
And 'round my heart still closely twine
Those ties which naught can sever,
For I am His and He is mine,
Forever and forever.

I've found a Friend; oh, such a Friend!
He bled, He died to save me;
And not alone the gift of life,
But His own self He gave me.
Naught that I have my own I call,
I hold it for the Giver;
My heart, my strength, my life, my all,
Are His and His forever.

I've found a Friend; oh, such a Friend!
All power to Him is given;
To guard me on my onward course,
And bring me safe to Heaven.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Th' eternal glories gleam afar,
To nerve my faint endeavor:
So now to watch, to work, to war
And then to rest forever.

I've found a Friend; oh, such a Friend!
So kind and true and tender,
So wise a Counsellor and Guide
So mighty a Defender.
From Him who loves me now so well,
What power my soul can sever?
Shall life or death, or earth or hell?
No; I am His forever.

Very closely connected with these hymns which satisfy the urge for security are those which satisfy our instincts of self-assertion and of acquisitiveness. The very fact that the sentiment is in poetical form augments its appeal, for in addition to a wide license in expression, poetry permits an individual interpretation which prose denies. A simple-minded person may accept the words literally and picture heaven as dripping with rubies and diamonds, silver and gold, while the more erudite recognize the figures of speech and accept for themselves blessings of a more spiritual character. Poetry greatly aids in an individualistic and personal interpretation, and the music is also distinctive in its

HYMNOLOGY

effect. Perhaps no better example of such could be given than the following:

My Father is rich in houses and lands,
He holdeth the wealth of the world in His hands!
Of rubies and diamonds, of silver and gold,
His coffers are full, He has riches untold.

Chorus

I'm the child of a King; the child of a King!
With Jesus my Saviour, I'm the child of a King!

My Father's own Son, the Savior of men,
Once wandered o'er earth as the poorest of them;
But now He is reigning for ever on high,
And will give me a home in heav'n by and by.

I once was an outcast stranger on earth,
A sinner by choice, an alien by birth!
But I've been adopted, my name's written down,
An heir to a mansion, a robe, and a crown!

A tent or a cottage, why should I care?
They're building a palace for me over there!
Tho' exiled from home, yet still I may sing:
All glory to God, I'm the child of a King.

There are many hymns expressing self-assurance, such as, "Blessed assurance, Jesus is mine," "I know

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

that my Redeemer lives." On the other hand we have those satisfying the instinct of self-abnegation, such as "Jesus I my cross have taken," "A sinner like me," or that well-known one written by Isaac Watts which follows:

Alas! and did my Saviour bleed
And did my Sovereign die?
Would He devote that sacred head
For such a worm as I?

Was it for crimes that I had done,
He groaned upon the tree?
Amazing pity, grace unknown,
And love beyond degree!

But drops of grief can ne'er repay
The debt of love I owe;
Here, Lord, I give myself away,
'Tis all that I can do!

We have some hymns which minister to another form of self-assertion. These show pride in accomplishment, such as overcoming temptation, progress in the Christian life, or final triumph through certain actions. Note this theme running through hymns such as, "How firm a foundation," "My Jesus, I love thee," "Yield not to temptation," "Hiding in thee," "It is well with my

HYMNOLOGY

soul," "We shall reign," "If God be for us," "Jesus saves," and "I know I love thee better, Lord." The following one is quoted:

When peace like a river, attendeth my way,
When sorrows like sea billows roll;
Whatever my lot, Thou hast taught me to say,
It is well, it is well, with my soul.

'Though Satan should buffet; tho' trials should come,
Let this blest assurance control,
That Christ hath regarded my helpless estate,
And hath shed His own blood for my soul.

My sin—oh the bliss of this glorious thought—
My sin—not in part but in whole
Is nailed to His cross and I bear it no more,
Praise the Lord, praise the Lord, oh, my soul!

And, Lord, haste the day when the faith shall be sight,
The clouds be roll'd back as a scroll,
The trump shall resound, and the Lord shall descend,
"Even so"—it is well with my soul.

The hymns making an appeal to flight from danger are not so common or so crass as they formerly were, when hell was so real.

However, flight with fear involved is still a powerful

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

instinct, and while the pictures of hell may be less vivid, and the description less detailed, there are conditions and situations which we may advisedly fear, and from which we should endeavor to flee. We are in need of some hymns based upon modern conditions which engender fear as the most prominent emotion. I quote a hymn by Henry Alleine written about 1790.

O how I shudder on the brink,
And groan at ev'ry breath;
My soul each hour expos'd to sink,
In everlasting death.

I cannot bear to take my flight,
With devils down in hell,
And banish'd from eternal light,
In endless night to dwell.

O save me thou indulgent God,
From everlasting pains;
And let it still be known abroad
A God of goodness reigns.

The modern revival books contain such appeals to flight as, "Why not tonight?" "The handwriting on the wall," "Repent ye," "How shall we escape?" "God calling yet," "No hope in Jesus," "Say, are you ready?"

HYMNOLOGY

"What shall I do to be saved?" and "The mistakes of my life." The following shows the type:

Should the Death-angel knock at thy chamber,
In the still watch of tonight,
Say, will your spirit pass into torment,
Or to the land of delight?

Chorus

Say, are you ready, O are you ready?
If the Death-angel should call;
Say, are you ready, O are you ready?
Mercy stands waiting for all.

Many sad spirits now are departing
Into the world of despair;
Ev'ry brief moment brings your doom nearer;
Sinner, O sinner, beware.

Many redeemed ones now are ascending
Into the mansions of light;
Jesus is pleading, patiently pleading,
O let Him save you tonight.

In response to our pugnacious instinct we sing, "Onward, Christian soldiers," "The Son of God goes forth to war," "Fight the good fight," "The banner of the cross," "A soldier of the Cross," "Faith is the victory,"

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

"Soldiers of Christ arise," "Go forward Christian soldier," "My soul be on thy guard," "Stand up, stand up for Jesus," "Brightly gleams our banner," and others. The singing of these hymns acts as a stimulus to and a battle cry of the victorious army, giving a sense of uplift and solidarity which was characteristic of the singing in the World War. The following hymn not only is permeated with a fighting spirit, but many soldiers in real wars have marched to its inspiring music.

Onward, Christian soldiers,
Marching as to war,
With the cross of Jesus
Going on before;
Christ the Royal Master
Leads against the foe;
Forward into battle,
See His banners go.

Chorus

Onward, Christian Soldiers,
Marching as to war,
With the cross of Jesus
Going on before.

At the sign of triumph
Satan's host doth flee;
On then, Christian soldiers,

HYMNOLOGY

On to victory:
Hell's foundations quiver
At the shout of praise;
Brothers, lift your voices
Loud your anthems raise.

Like a mighty army
Moves the church of God;
Brothers, we are treading
Where the saints have trod.
We are not divided,
All one body we,
One in hope and doctrine,
One in charity.

Writers of religious hymns have taken advantage of the strength of the sexual instinct and have, at times, so thinly veiled the appeal that it can scarcely be called idealized. If not found in a hymnbook, some of these might very well be mistaken for the expression of rapture of a lovesick maiden. Some of the saints of the Middle Ages were similarly confused. At the beginning of the century one of the most popular hymns sung at young people's meetings and at camp meetings was the following:

Blessed lily of the valley—oh, how fair is He!
He is mine, I am His.

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Sweeter than the angels' music is His voice to me,
He is mine, I am His.
Where the lilies fair are blooming by the waters calm,
There he leads me and upholds me by His strong right arm
All the air is love around me—I can feel no harm—
He is mine, I am His.

I quote a modern example:

I come to the garden alone,
While the dew is still on the roses;
And the voice I hear,
Falling on my ear,
The Son of God discloses.

Chorus

And He walks with me,
And He talks with me,
And He tells me I am His own;
And the joy we share,
As we tarry there,
None other has ever known.

He speaks, and the sound of His voice
Is so sweet the birds hush their singing,
And the melody
That He gave to me,
Within my heart is ringing.

HYMNOLOGY

I'd stay in the garden with Him,
Though the night around me be falling,
But He bids me go;
Thro' the voice of woe,
His voice to me is calling.

Hymns are used in camp meetings and revival meetings for purposes other than for making a religious appeal through the instincts. The leader endeavors to develop a solidarity in the audience, and thus form the auditors into a psychological crowd by means of the united singing and the effect of the rhythm. Further, he uses hymn singing to develop a suggestibility, which later may be used for the main purpose of the meeting. He asks the congregation to sing certain hymns, which is common procedure, but then asks, further, for certain verses or repetition, or one stanza to be sung by men and another by women, or the choir to sing one stanza and the rest of the congregation another, and in different ways obtains instant and perfect obedience by this means. This prepares the audience for the main appeal when it is given later. No other element of the meeting can be used so effectively.

It has not been the intention, in this discussion, to cover the whole list of instincts, but simply to give illustrations of the appeal which is made to the instincts by religion, and this appeal is somewhat more obvious

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

in the hymns. The hymns chosen have been those used in revivals, and an objection may be made that these are not representative. That may be true but not pertinent. These have been chosen because of their motive power, and consequently their more frank appeal to instinctive tendencies. If, however, we examine the more representative and finer hymns we shall find them also permeated with appeals to the instincts. That is what makes them great. It is noticeable that few intellectual appeals are made through these hymns; perhaps the intrinsic nature of hymns precludes that.

Chapter VIII

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS IN THIS TWENTIETH CENTURY

MODERN civilization has not destroyed or eliminated the instincts, and intelligence has not become an adequate substitute for the instincts; the instincts are still functioning and functioning powerfully—they are the motive power, the driving force of life. If we had reached the condition, evidently much desired by some, when instincts were no longer active, then we would be passive nonentities.

If we are to move men to action we need the appeal to the instincts as much today as in the pre-historic times of our early human ancestors. Basic human nature has not changed—modern conditions demand a somewhat modified response, that is all. Both appeal and response in the human animal follow the same pattern which early distinguished our race and helped us on our upward climb.

Already attention has been called to the appeal to the instincts which will not bear the scrutiny of the intelligence, but which is immediately effective in producing action. This action is temporarily effective but on ac-

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

count of its lacking intellectual sanction cannot be of permanent value. In like manner we have indicated the lack of motive power in an appeal to the intellect which begs us to take part in an enterprise wholly because of its soundness of plan. To this latter appeal we give intellectual assent but no definite action. If we are to have action—action in the direction of permanency and value—we must combine these appeals. But can we?

We can. The method seems to be a chronological reversal of the natural development. We first work out our plan, being sure that it is based on the latest information and contains all available facts, then submit it to the closest scrutiny of the intelligence, thus having the approval of scientific investigation and logical criticism. Having it now in condition for a fine intellectual appeal we stop abruptly and turn the task of making the appeal over to the instincts.

Having taken the precaution of having the approval of the intelligence and therefore eliminating the risk of rejection on account of logical inaccuracy or fallacy, we ask what instincts can do to put it into action. We are immediately confronted with many human instincts and seek to apply them to the plan with which the intelligence has provided us. It is not difficult; the danger is that we may think we are farming with the crooked stick of our primitive ancestors instead of the

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS

tractor harvester of our contemporaries; we must remember that we have at our hand not only primary but secondary satisfactions. It is the test of rare skill to use the plan of the intellect to appeal to primitive instincts incased in the veneer of modern civilization—we are continually shifting our eyes to the veneer instead of fastening them upon the instincts. It is the instincts which are real and substantial, not the veneer!

The politician, while perhaps denying any knowledge of an appeal to the instincts, is most adept in its use. He wants action and immediate action. I have already called attention to the appeal to flight made in the federal elections of 1928 and 1932, and that to acquisition in 1936, in this country, but other instinctive appeals are common in politics, while the appeals to the intellect are rare, especially among the victors.

Naturally the whole political game is an appeal to self-preservation, but not infrequently we have appeals to self-assertion with the accompanying emotion of pride. This comes most often, perhaps, when the political plea has some reference to other nations. National honor is the call of those who lack it, patriotism the last refuge of a scoundrel—but usually very effective. It is not necessary to single out any one instinct, for the politician usually runs the whole gamut and uses them all very effectively. Perhaps I should note one exception—he rarely can use the sexual instinct except

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

in an indirect, secondary way as the creative instinct. But the use of this as of the others is not purely individualistic—as elsewhere noted, appeals usually are made to several instincts combined.

Theologians, moralists, reformers, and people interested in social betterment could well take some lessons from the politicians. Of course, they say that they would not descend to do some things which the politicians do, and that is well. But they do not have to; they have many instincts with which to deal, and secondary as well as primary responses to which to appeal—the whole field of nature is open to them; why try to pull with the regulator? Why appeal to the intelligence when the instincts are available? How foolish some of the successful political appeals seem to us now as we look back over them! Foolish, to be sure, as we view them intellectually, but very wise as appeals to the instinctive motives of the time and age.

In addition to taking lessons from the politicians, the theologians might learn something also from the advertisers, for they also want action and plenty of it. Their appeal, very subtle at times, is to the instincts, and, I fear, they do not always have the approval of the intelligence. Recently I looked over the advertising pages of one of the most widely circulated magazines in America—appealing to the middle class, i.e., the

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS

middle purse people. In addition to many smaller advertisements, I found thirty-five of two-thirds of a page or more. These I divided into seven different classes according to the instinctive appeal manifested, (I) Self-preservation, including flight from possible dangers, thirteen, as follows: health 8, insurance 2, investment 1, food 1, safety-top auto 1. (II) Acquisition, mostly for ease, amusement, or convenience, ten, as follows: auto 2, radio 2, fountain pen 2, kodak 1, vacuum cleaner 1, razor blades 1, refrigerator 1. (III) Flight from reality, four, all whisky. (IV) Sex and self-assertion, three, all soap. (V) Regression to sucking instinct, two, both smoking tobacco. (VI) Curiosity and self-assertion, two, magazine 1, book 1. (VII) Pride and parental, one, caskets.

Other magazines would give different results, and other persons would classify these advertisements differently. However that may be, it was interesting to notice how little appeal was directed to the intelligence, but how much care was taken to escape an intellectual veto. If the reader says after reading an advertisement, "That's nonsense!" the appeal is dead as far as he is concerned; but if the advertisement escapes intellectual dissent, the way is open for even a crass appeal to the instincts. In the lowest class magazines the appeals are largely to acquisition and sex—at least, these are pre-eminent; something for nothing and

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

marriage bureaus take the place of some of the advertisements listed above.

When one turns from advertising in periodicals to propaganda in an extensive way, we find the same rules hold good. The use of even a low intelligence would often inform us that the propaganda is founded on unreasonable statements. When prejudice is once aroused and the principles of crowd psychology appear, intelligence loses its discriminating power, and any statement may be acceptable. This is seen particularly in the fury of war and in the heat of political elections. Nothing is too bad, too unreasonable, or too impossible to believe at such times. Appeals are then made to primary instinctive action, and often most successfully.

Appeals of any kind are, after all, a matter of salesmanship. Upon what does the advertiser depend? The fine analyses of Consumers' Research, or the appeals to the parental, acquisitive, and self-defense instincts? Advertisements may be somewhat unreasonable, but if they have the proper instinctive appeal they attract the customers. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is not only an appeal to the gregarious instinct, but more especially to that of self-assertion and self-defense. The appeal which is connected with several instincts at the same time is not only more powerful, as far as

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS

the individual is concerned, but its different angles appeal to many more individuals.

Reformers fail because their schemes, in order to satisfy the intelligence, are often complicated. Ideas must be single, and language must be suggestive and must paint pictures. The great mass of people are not very intelligent, not to say intellectual, after all. Suppose we should try to run an election on the tariff, the gold standard, the League of Nations, the conduct of the Treasury, or any similar theme. What would it mean to one hundred and twenty million people out of our total population? Absolutely nothing! They know nothing about it, they care nothing about it, they would read nothing about it, they could neither understand it nor picture it. But put before them the idea, not the details, of Share-the-Wealth, and immediately everyone applauds. They know what that means; some man has ten dollars, puts his hand in his pocket and produces five and gives it to you. What could be more simple? What could be more enjoyable? Ask him how he could thus divide up the Standard Oil Company or the Ford Motor Company, or the United States Steel Company, and he looks at you with disdain. He neither knows nor cares—he won't think of it; it spoils his picture and his pleasure. It interferes with the satisfaction of his acquisitive urge. He does not care how it is done, so long as he

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

gets it, and his instinct demands that he should get it, so he believes it.

Slogans, which the intellectuals haughtily reject, and which the practical accept and use, are admirably adapted to make an instinctive appeal. What is the reason for their effectiveness and what are the essentials of a good slogan?

In the first place it should sound well and mean nothing definite. For this purpose it should be witty, short, and crisp, and contain only one idea. The single idea is more important than its brevity. For example, "England expects every man to do his duty" is as long but a much better slogan than, "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free Men." The latter was confusing in its complexity, and was finally shortened to "Free Soil." With the exception of the repetition of the word "free" this slogan had no attraction in its form. Its chief defect was that it was too definite. Definiteness always invites argument and opposition; this one invited four arguments and opposition from more than four quarters. Wit, in a slogan, not only pleases people, but they always want to shout and repeat things that are clever and popular. The wit in a slogan provides for its transportation and encourages its repetition, while it makes it difficult to attack. The only effective method of attack is more wit. When the German emperor spread the doctrine of the danger of Chinese aggres-

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS

sion by the term "Yellow Peril," a Chinese Ambassador replied, "No, not the Yellow Peril, but the Golden Opportunity."

A good slogan should not only sound well and mean nothing definite, but it should mean more than it says. Its very indefiniteness helps in this. All you can attack in a slogan is what it says, its effectiveness consists in the suggestive meaning which is free from attack. To aid in this respect, the slogan should contain some indefinite term, which means all things to all men, and which each person can interpret for himself. Such terms as "Democracy," "Freedom," "Liberty," "Equality," "Oppression," "Fraternity," and other general terms which no one can define, but of which everyone thinks he knows the meaning, are most valuable. Through what the psychologists call a "conditioned reflex," the very sound of these words arouses an emotion which stirs us to fight. These are the terms which the Fourth of July orator used to produce enthusiasm. For the life of us we can not tell why we become so enthusiastic when these terms are used, any more than we can definitely define the terms: but it is because in times past we have been in similar audiences which became excited upon the mention of these words, and we automatically do so again. It is all a matter of crowd psychology, and a crowd is carried away by suggestion—the crowd never reasons. The slogan, then,

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

must be used to take the place of thought, and substitutes for thought seem to be the demand of our time.

A slogan usually capitalizes prejudice. This is frequently seen in advertising slogans but also in war and in politics. Of course, it is not recognized as using prejudice at the time, if it were it would lose its power. The prejudice is usually locked up in the suggestion rather than in the definite statement. In politics very few people know the candidates, and not many understand the issue, if there is one. Thus the slogan usually misrepresents the candidate, in his favor, and takes the place of the issue. If the issue is a clear-cut and vital one, a slogan is of little avail. The slogan is of most value when there is no issue of importance.

Let us take for example one of the best slogans ever coined, Mr. Wilson's "Making the World Safe for Democracy." It sounds well and means nothing definite. No one knows what it means to make the world safe for democracy, any more than he knows what democracy means. The only real definition of democracy which has been generally accepted is Mr. Lincoln's "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people"; that has never been tried, so we don't know how it would work. This slogan capitalizes our prejudice in favor of what each one thinks is democracy, and it makes a broad appeal for the whole

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS

world—nothing small about that! It appeals to our altruism, for by this means we are to bestow the great boons of safety and democracy upon a world much in need of both, and it is flattering to us at the same time, for it is an effort to make the rest of the world as good as we are, although, of course, we can hardly hope to do that. Best of all it leads us into the war where we can become aggressive under a philanthropic motive, and if people don't want to be made safe for democracy we can kill them with a clear conscience, for it shows that they don't know what is good for themselves. There it is all in a nutshell. What more could you ask?

From wherever we take our illustrations we come finally to the question of motivation. Why should we move, and how can anything move us? These are academic questions in the ethical realm. But why do we move, and what moves us? These are practical questions, and the answer rumbles down through the millenniums until it reaches its culmination in our day. We are the heirs of the ages! Every experience of the race in the last million years is indelibly traced in every cell of our bodies. The battles of our unicellular ancestors in the primordial ooze were not wasted, but have living expression in every bodily fiber, every contest of physical skill, every mental challenge of every individual, and in the Armageddon which nations stage. If the remotest battle left its scar, every

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

battle since then has deepened it, and no animal is so timid, and no individual is so meek, that he does not feel the thrill when a fight is in the offing.

The time element is an important distinction between the instincts and the intelligence. The instincts brook no delay. The stimulus is immediately followed by action. With the instinct it is now or never, with the intelligence it is never now. The intelligence wants to think it over, to gather all the facts and to compare them, to weigh consequences and to decide on values. All that has been worked out through the experiences of eons, and the final result, and the final result only, is recorded in the instincts. Few of the experiences which gave us these results can ever be known in detail, but they are all taken into account. All we have to do is to look in the back of the book to see the answer. The trouble with intelligence is that it may come to a decision but to no action.

Intelligence is the judge sitting upon the bench, instinct is the executive at the head of a business. The judge hears the evidence, sees that a proper transcript is taken of it, takes home the reports, reads the briefs, looks up the law, and finally gives a decision. The executive wants action and engenders it. He is an umpire, not a judge; it is more important that he give an immediate decision so that the game can continue than that he give a correct one, but if he gives too

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS

many incorrect ones he loses his job. The executive's orders are to produce and to do it immediately. He forces all his subordinates into action and co-ordinates their work so as to obtain results in the shortest possible time. Action is the real essence of instinct, accompanied by feeling which is usually pleasurable.

While we tend to classify instincts and give names to our classification, all the lives of millions of ancestors cannot be included in any scheme. We are moved because our successful ancestors acted in certain patterns and won. Each pattern must have been at one time individualistic and only after myriads of generations became racial. The value of it was not debated on the protected and sheltered platform of a forum, but tried out in the coliseum where defeat meant death. That is the kind of a test which meant something—to be or not to be, that was the question—and having withstood the rigors of such a contest, it meant that the laurel wreaths made deep marks upon the victor's brow. Oh! that we could read the record that each bodily cell contains! If you knew the history of your finger nail you would be the wisest man in the world—you would know what God and man is.

I suppose the instincts give us the most far-reaching, the most comprehensive, and the most intelligent history of mankind. Of mankind? Of millions of years before mankind! Do you want to know about man?

INSTINCTS AND RELIGION

Scan this history and study it well. In this is the secret of motivation. Undoubtedly many anxious parents are asking why their sons at college should be so much interested in a prom dance and so lethargic about the next day's studies, when the studies are so much more important. Quite so! Well, ask the instincts. Prom dances, or their Cro-Magnon equivalent, were the most important things in the world in the days before the land was littered with books and reading and studies and classes. The instincts have recorded that fact and insist that prom dances or their biological equivalent are still important.

What do you want to know about human conduct? Ask the instincts, they are the biological Mr. Foster. How can you move people? Ask the instincts, they know the secret, and will tell it. They may not speak in such loud tones, or use such large type as they did in the days of Mr. Pilt-Down, but what they say is just as important and just as reliable. Some knowledge of a transitory character we can afford to discard, and some informants who whisper gossip we can afford to ignore, but those who are wise enough to recognize the secrets of life take heed to what the instincts say, and especially is this true along the lines of motivation. Without intelligence we would be morons or worse, but without the instincts we would be lumps of inertia, and there isn't anything worse!

THE APPEAL TO THE INSTINCTS

What has been set forth in this chapter may not seem to have much to do with religion, but it has. The way people are moved to action in various phases of life has been presented, and people are still people when dealing with their religious problems, and the motive power is not different. People who become abnormal as soon as they enter a church or pronounce the name of God are not religious, they are pretentious, and ostentatious. Religion is not for such, but for the unaffected and the sincere. Artificiality cannot capture the Kingdom of God.

Religion is life. Religion is life in its most comprehensive form. All that has been said about other manifestations of life is equally applicable to religious life. Its progress is a matter of salesmanship, its continuance depends on a series of choices. Religious appeals are appeals to the instincts, whenever they move people to action. What more profitable for people interested in religion than an intensive study of the instincts, and what more practical than an application of the results of such a study to twentieth-century life? If we are to lead men to higher levels of future life we must do it through appeals to the lower levels of past life, for here still dwell the motivating agents of all life.

INDEX

- Acquisition, 57, 100f
- Advertising, 140f
- Altruism, 43, 113f
- Categorical imperative, 47ff
- Chain-reflex, 16
- Communism, 60f
- Competition, 112f
- Conflict, 82f
- Conscience, 48f
- Criminality, 71ff
- Crowds, 35ff
- Crusades, 107f
- Degeneration, 50f, 93ff
- Divided Self, 81f
- Emotion, 23f, 28
- Fear, 62, 64, 92, 94f
- Flight, 47, 62, 94f, 129f
- Gregariousness, 12, 36, 43, 62
- Habit, 15, 17, 24
- Heaven, 57ff
- Hymnology, Chap. VII
- Immortality, 56f, 63
- Instincts, Chap. I, 148
 - and religion, 3
 - and war, 21f
 - appeals to, 6, 89ff, 100, 137, 151
 - definition of, 2, 23, 26
 - development of, 14
- Instincts—(*Continued*)
 - ignored, 1, 4, 8
 - interpretation of, 2
 - magic of, 9
 - modified, 2, 15f
 - necessary, 18f
 - number of, 2, 11, 25
 - power of, 11
 - primary satisfaction of, 20, 22, 27, 29, 30f, 41, 54f, 78
 - secondary satisfaction of, 20, 27, 30, 34, 42, 79
 - transitory, 17
- Integration, 67f, 83f
- Intelligence, Chap. II, 13, 148
 - appeals to, 92
- Interest, 24
- Learning, 7, 10, 12
- Mobs, 35ff
- Modern theology, Chap. VI
- Moody revival, 118f
- Morals, Chap. III, 71ff
- Motivation, 13, 18, 20, 28, 29, 31, 40, 89, 137f, 147
- Original sin, 76f
- Pleasure principle, 20, 85
- Politics, 99, 139f, 143
- Psychoanalysts, 10, 20, 69, 74, 82
- Psychological approach, 1
- Pugnacity, 30, 41f, 45, 61f, 106f, 131f

INDEX

- Rationalism, 87f, 91
Rationalizing, 29, 34, 38
Regression, 17f
Religion, Chap. IV
 definition, 52
 unstable, 4
Repression, 46, 68
Revivals, 117ff, 135f
Rhythm, 122f

Security, 57f, 123ff
Self-assertion, 108ff

Sex, 43, 45, 62, 133f
Sin, Chap. V
Slogans, 144ff
Social gospel, 74, 111
Sociologists, 11f
Sublimation, 30, 53, 83

Total depravity, 77f

War, 21, 54, 93
Welsh revival, 117f
Wesley revival, 118